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Sojourners And Survivors: Two Logics Of
Constitutional Protection
ROBERT MEISTER

Liberal political analysis is ordinarily based on a sharp distinction between
domestic and international politics, and an assumption that domestic politics
is the proper arena for democratic self-determination. But self-governing
citizens have never exhausted the cast of characters who populate liberal states.
Living alongside them there are often domestic aliens-permanent -residents
who are subject to the law, and may be protected by it, but who do not
participate in making it. Refugees and remnants also inhabit liberal states.
Whether citizens or not, they tend to bear the historical consciousness of
victims or potential victims wherever they may live. A correlative fact is that
in many now-liberal societies the meaning of citizenship itself is indelibly
marked by the missing-the emigrant and the exile, the expelled and the
extinct.' Such identities-and the historical presence or absence of individuals
who claim them-are generally regarded as messy details in the state-centered
conceptual framework that dominates liberal political thought.2
This Article contributes to an emerging argument that democratic legitimacy is essentially interstate in character, and that transnational membership

Robert Meister is Professor of Politics at the University of California at Santa Cruz. He
is grateful to Daniel Ortiz, Akhil Amar, Michael Urban, Jonathan Bush, Guyora Binder,
Mahmood Mamdani, Karen Orren, Robert Post and an anonymous reader for helpful
comments, to Will Hull and Jana Carter for able assistance in research, and to Roger
Schwartz for editorial assistance. Financial assistance was provided by the Academic Senate
and the Social Sciences Division of UCSC. This paper was originally delivered at a conference on "Constitutions and 'Survivor Stories'" at the University of California, Santa
Cruz, January 13-14, 1995. An earlier version of this Article appeared in 9 Stud Am Pol
Dev 229 (1995).
1. See, for example, Jonathan A. Bush, "You're Gonna Miss Me When I'm Gone":
Early Modern Common Law Discourse and the Case of the Jews, 1993 Wis L Rev 1225
(exploring the degree to which and why the legal status of Jews continued to be widely
discussed throughout common law discourse following the Expulsion of the Jews in 1290).
Similar work might be done on the missing Muslims in Spain, the missing Huguenots in
France, and other groups.
2. See, for example, Ann Dummett and Andrew Nicol, Subjects, Citizens, Aliens and
Others: Nationality and Immigration Law (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1990).
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should become more central to democratic theory than it has been thus far.
Other contributors to this argument have focused on the tension between
seeing a constitution as the Law of the Land and as the Law of a People;3 on
the legitimacy of international acts by democratic states;4 and on the potential
conflict between openness to immigration and political self-determination.' In
recent years there has also been an impressive literature that relates issues of
jurisdiction, choice of law, and interstate comity in American federalism to
broader problems in both democratic theory and international law.6 The
discussion that follows will expand upon this basic idea and identify contrasting approaches to the protection of individuals and groups in an interstate
system in which territorially-based governments are presumed to be popular.
This Article will argue that American constitutional development reflects
two fundamentally different ways of thinking about the problem of discrimination by democratic regimes. The first was based originally on the need to
distinguish U.S. citizens living out of state-sojourners, as we shall call
them-from internal groups that could be legitimately disadvantaged by local

3. See, for example, Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard, 1992). For a discussion of the U.S. see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L J 909 (1991). This essay entertains such ideas as "global due
process" in a world of interpenetrating nationalities.
4. See, for example, Lea Brilmayer, Justifying International Acts (Cornell, 1989); Lea
Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower World (Yale,
1994); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 Yale L J 2347
(1991); and Neuman, 100 Yale L J .909 (cited in note 3).
5. See Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality ch 2
(Basic Books, 1983); Brian Barry and Robert E. Goodin, eds, Free Movement: Ethical
Issues in the TransnationalMigration of People and of Money (Penn State, 1992); William
Rogers Brubaker, ed, Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North
America (University Press of America, 1989); Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago, 1994); and Henry G.
Schermers, et al, eds, Free Movement of Persons in Europe: Legal Problems and Experiences (Martinus Nijhoff, 1993).
6. Leading contributors are Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock, and Gerald L. Neuman.
See, for example, Lea Brilmayer, Carolene, Conflicts, and the Fate of the "Inside Outsider", 134 U Pa L Rev 1291 (1986); Lea Brilmayer, The William B. Lockhart Lecture:
Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 Minn L Rev 1 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Shaping and
Sharing in Democratic Theory: Towards a Political Philosophy of Interstate Equality, 15
Fla St U L Rev 389 (1987); Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws:
The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context,
70 Iowa L Rev 95 (1984); Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As
Between State and Federal Law, 79 Mich L Rev 1315 (1981); Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 Yale L J 1277 (1989); Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preemption:
The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the Right to Die, 91 Mich L Rev 873 (1993);
and, generally, Lea Brilmayer, An Introduction to Jurisdiction in the American Federal
System (Michie, 1986). See also Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial
States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 Colum L Rev 249 (1992);
Gerald L. Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection, and Self Determination,
135 U Pa L Rev 261 (1987).
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majority rule. The second was based originally on the need to recover from the
horrors of slavery and the Civil War and to protect the living victims-survivors, as we shall call them-from a repetition of past patterns of
abuse.7
These two problems eventually became metaphors for other problems in
U.S. history. The figure of the sojourner was generalized to encompass the
believer in an alien creed, the member of a marginal group, and eventually the
bearer of an alternative conception of human normality. The figure of the
slave was similarly generalized to encompass other (but not all) victims of
material and cultural oppression. Despite these transformations, however, each
implicit paradigm of nondiscrimination has retained much of its original logic
even as it has absorbed some elements of the other.
The following discussion will explore the sources of these logics, their
different consequences, and the dynamics of their interaction and conflict. Our
concern, however; will be less with the history of the ideas that motivate political actors than with the more or less deeply embedded patterns of thought
that shape political arguments and the responses to them. These patterns of
thought, derived from constitutional doctrine, are a source of familiar themes
and progressions of our popular politics, but not exactly in the way that
classical music might be shown to be a source of familiar themes and progressions in our popular music. Rather, my view is that the constitutional
logics of protecting sojourners and of protecting survivors each has a tendency
to undermine itself and, ultimately, to motivate the other. These self-subverting
tendencies are concealed in popular discourse, and can be revealed by identifying the two logics and distinguishing between them.
This Article will not conclude, however, that the painful tensions in our
own domestic liberalism can be overcome by either reconciling the two logics,
or by choosing between them. I hope, rather, to sketch the beginning of a
more transnational perspective on the conflict between the equality of persons
and the equality of peoples in an interstate system based on liberal legalism.
What follows then is an effort to redescribe the dynamics of U.S. constitutional
development in terms that might make the emerging problems of world politics
seem once again our own.
I. Sojourners and Citizens
We must begin by considering the very special context in which a constitutional right to nondiscrimination originated in this country. The world order
in which the American colonies sought and won their independence was based
upon a distinction between internationallaw and imperial law. In the realm of
public international law, sovereign states communed and negotiated as equals
in an interstate society. This aspect of international law was supplanted within
7. We shall see, below, that this paradigm of survivorship placed the rights of indigenous peoples in jeopardy in post-Civil War America.
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eighteenth century empires by an internal hierarchy of royal courts with
jurisdiction over transnational claims arising from the diversity of cultural and
political systems that might be ruled at any given moment by a common
sovereign. The substance of imperial law was thus directly concerned with
questions of private international law that often remained in the background
of the relations of sovereign states that participated in the international legal
order.8
By struggling for independence from England, the American colonies
sought in effect to shift the context of their relations with Europe from the
imperial to the international legal system, and to thereby extend the interstate
community of sovereign states across the Atlantic. Recent scholarship suggests
that the invention and development of American federalism may have been a
redirection inward of these hopes and ideals as a result of disappointment with
the promise of liberal internationalism in the years that followed American
independence and the French Revolution!
Whatever the merits of this particular thesis, it is clear that our federal
system combined elements of preexisting international and imperial law into a
new way of governing relations among the former colonies of a common monarch. Under the U.S. Constitution, the traditional role of public international
law-a system of treaties-was to be replaced by the Constitution itself and
federal legislation enacted under it."0 There remained, however, all of the
issues that had been treated under the Empire as matters of private international law-especially the problems of jurisdiction and choice of law that arise
in a transnational civil society consisting of many non-state actors with claims
arising under foreign law.
The traditional subject matter of private international law concerns the
way domestic courts should treat the conflicts between domestic and foreign
law, and (at least since the seventeenth century) the prevailing view has been

8. See, for example, James Mayall, Nationalism and InternationalSociety ch 2 (Cambridge, 1990).

9. See Pete- Onuf and Nicholas Onuf, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of
Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776-1814 (Madison House, 1993). This study provides
some evidence that the leaders of the American Revolution believed Vattel's claim that the
eighteenth century community of autocratic states amounted to an interstate republic of
equal sovereigns based on law and liberal ideas. See id at 16-19. In this account, a
principal goal of American independence from the British Empire was to gain direct access
to the world of international diplomacy, so as to negotiate treaties that would guarantee
the former colonies security, promote trade, and bring about a more lawful world. Id at
95. The authors conclude that American federalism became necessary because the American
revolutionaries who had gained their independence by "exploiting the old world balance
of power" found that they could not negotiate advantageous mercantilist treaties with a
Europe at war in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Id at 117, 161-62. The specifics
of this argument are not entirely persuasive, but its broad contours are consistent with my
claim below that American federalism is in large degree an involutional development of the
view of international relations that prevailed at the time of American independence.
10. A prominent early example was the Northwest Ordinance of 1789.
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that every sovereign state is free to decide on the basis of its own domestic
and foreign policy how much diversity and uniformity there should be in the
laws applied by its own domestic courts." Within the newly formed United
States, however, comity among jurisdictions was not merely a local judicial
commitment, but a constitutional requirement.' This meant that apparent
conflicts between federal or state laws," or conflicts among the laws of the
various states, 4 could raise questions of constitutional import. Resolving such
questions called for a distinctive body of federal constitutional law on most of
the traditional choice-of-law questions in the context of what Douglas Laycock
calls "equal citizens of equal [and] territorial states."" s The development of a
federal constitutional law to replace private international law was complicated
by the fact that each U.S. citizen-initially subject to two equal sovereigns,
state and federal-was also constitutionally entitled to live under federal
protection as a domestic alien in other states. With a status between that of
citizen and alien, this "inside-outsider" was to be legitimately subject to the
scope of local state power "but outside the processes of political participation."' This third basis of sovereignty over the individual, the sovereignty of
another state, lies at the root of what I shall call the "sojourner" model of

11. The view that comity was a matter of positive law in each territorial forum was
held by Justice Joseph Story, a member of the Marshall Court, whose Commentaries on
the Conflict of Laws (Little, Brown, 2d ed 1841) should be read as a companion to his
classic Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Little Brown, 2d ed 1851).
For discussions of the importance of transnational law and its variable relation to
intergovernmental agreements see Philip C. Jessup, TransnationalLaw (Yale, 1956); Albert
A. Ehrenzweig, Private InternationalLaw: A Comparative Treatise on American International Conflicts Law, Including the Law of Admiralty (Oceana, 3d ed 1974); Anne-Marie
Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalismand the Act of State Doctrine,
92 Colum L Rev 1907 (1992); Anne-Marie Burley, Toward an Age of Liberal Nations, 33
Harv Inld L J 393 (1992); and Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, Europe Before the
Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 Intl Org 41 (1993). For a discussion
of transnational public law see Koh, 100 Yale L J at 2350-75 (cited in note 4).
12. US Const, Art IV, S§ 1-2.
13. See McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
14. If, for example, there was a conflict between the laws of state A and state B on
enforcing some aspect of slavery, it was now in part a federal question when and whether
the courts in A were obliged to apply the laws of B, how far they were free to reinterpret
those laws in a way that might be subsequently binding in B, and how far a distinctive
body of federal law might preempt both. In practice this federal question was often decided in state courts. For an extensive recent discussion of the role of interstate comity in
the development of American slavery see Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery,
Federalism, and Comity (North Carolina, 1981). See also Robert Meister, The Logic and
Legacy of Dred Scott: Marshall, Taney, and the Sublimation of Republican Thought, 3

Stud Am Pol Dev 199 (1989).
15. Laycock, 92 Colum L Rev at 250-51 (cited in note 6). See also Robert H.
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit: The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 Colum L Rev
1 (1945).
16. See Brilmayer, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1293 (cited in note 6).
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nondiscrimination.
What did it mean for a citizen of one state to live in another under federal
protection? In answering this question, the pre-Civil War Supreme Court was
careful to preserve the democratic power of the local majorities in each state
to rule in their own interests. For this reason federalism could not, as a
general matter, require the extraterritorial enforcement of the laws of one's
own state when one resided elsewhere;17 neither could federalism prevent the
states from denying equal rights to their own citizens." Federalism could,
however, bar the local majority from imposing any legal disadvantage on outof-state U.S. citizens that the local majority did not also impose on itself.
Under this model of nondiscrimination the local majority would become the
virtual representative of some minorities-those identified with a federally
recognized claim to statehood elsewhere.
These specially protected minorities were not to be confused with the
minority as described in democratic theory. Within the Madisonian theory of
democracy on which the U.S. Constitution was based, the minority, as such,
did not require special constitutional protection. Its members were identified
only by the process by which the political majority itself is constituted at any
given moment. 9 These internal losers in the democratic process could be
legitimately bound by laws that disadvantaged them, unless there was a
conceded violation of the natural rights on which the state constitutions were
based.2" In addition to asserting the legally unenforceable natural rights that
they shared with the local minority, members of the interstate diaspora could
claim a right under the U.S. Constitution to be treated as well as the local
majority treats itself.2
This idea marks a striking departure from the natural rights tradition that
grounds the legitimate rule of one part of the population over others on a
baseline of substantive moral rights that are held to be both natural and
universal. In our dominant constitutional tradition originating with Marshall,

17. The exceptions were generally matters that had been fully adjudicated elsewhere.

This was the meaning of the "full faith and credit" clause. US Const, Art IV, S 1. See
Brilmayer, 70 Iowa L Rev at 95-97 (cited in note 6).
18. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101 Yale
L J 1385, 1397-1433 (1992).

19. This contrasts with the Warren-era conception of permanent minorities as "discrete
and insular" groups excluded from all possible majority coalitions. On this point see Ely's
use of the Carolene Products footnote to interpret the jurisprudence of the Warren Court.
John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 75-77 (Harvard,
1980). For critical comments see Brilmayer, 134 U Pa L Rev at 1291 (cited in note 6).
20. See Sylvia Snowiss, Judicial Review and the Law of the Constitution ch 4 (Yale,
1990).
21. See, for example, Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1398 (cited in note 18). There is also,
however, a countertradition of constitutional interpretation that argues that natural rights

were constitutionalized through the privileges and/or immunities clauses of the Constitution.
See, for example, Justice Bushrod Washington's famous dictum on this point in Corfield
v Coryell, 6 F Cas 546 (CCED Pa 1823) (No 3230).
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the baseline is neither natural nor universal; rather, it is set by the level of
beneficial entitlement that the majority in each sovereign state confers upon
itself through positive law. Once the substantive baseline has been set by state
law, the Comity Clause of the Constitution 22 requires that the "privileges and
immunities" of state citizenship (civil, but not political rights) be conferred on
out-of-state U.S. citizens. The principle of interstate comity is thus the source
of the tendency in American constitutional law to replace a substantive notion
of directly enforceable natural rights with an equality-based notion of nondiscrimination. '
Before the Civil War, this constitutional right to nondiscrimination was
essentially limited to U.S. citizens living out-of-state. The claim that the local
majority cannot legitimately discriminate against them in a particularstate was
a federally recognized consequence of their rights as citizens of another state
where they could be legitimately subject to majority rule in the strong
Madisonian sense. Federally protected constitutional rights were not rooted in
the natural rights of individuals, but were rather the traces of one's own
state's equal and alternative claim to sovereignty in the interstate system.24
This idea is John Marshall's great contribution to world political thought.
Within Marshall's conceptual framework, the fundamental limitation of our
original Constitution lay in its treatment of persons who were stateless sojourners. Such persons were subject to the law of any state in which they
lived, and yet were outside the protections of the federal Constitution because
they could not claim the rights of a people sovereign elsewhere. Three groups
fell into this category in different ways, and to differing degrees.
The first group was legally resident aliens. They had limited rights as
persons to live in the United States under the protection of its laws, but were
not entitled to nondiscrimination with respect to the privileges and immunities
of state citizens. As John Harrison puts it:
[C]itizens had rights that aliens, who were persons but not citizens, did
not. Most importantly, aliens generally were not permitted to own real
property except as specifically provided by state law. Indeed, the classic
way of explaining the operation of the Comity Clause was to say that it
would relieve visiting Americans of the disabilities of aliens and thus
allow them to own real estateY
Under the Marshallian scheme, aliens would become entitled to nondiscrimina-

22. "The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States." US Const, Art IV, § 2.
23. This is the central thesis of Harrison, 100 Yale L J 1385 (cited in note 18).
24. See Brilmayer, 134 U Pa L Rev 1291 (cited in note 6). For a provocative discussion of "the possible uses of democratic theory in the interstate context" see id at
1298-1303. For a comprehensive view of the terrain see Laycock, 92 Colum L Rev 249
(cited in note 6).
25. Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1442 (cited in note 18).
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tion only if they were naturalized. The constitutional text itself does not
expressly deny the states power to naturalize foreigners in the event that
Congress failed to legislate a uniform rule. In 1817, however, the Marshall
Court determined that the federal power of naturalization was preemptive, 26
thereby allowing Congress to expand the category of constitutionally protected
sojourners to include naturalized federal citizens.
A second category of stateless residents was the descendants of the
indigenous population of every state at the time of its white settlement. The
treatment of such persons as dependent sovereign nations 27 was originally
thought necessary to legitimate U.S. acquisition of their former territories,28
and eventually became grounds for denying them birthright citizenship in the
United States after the Civil War. Yet the theory of tribal sovereignty was
never considered to be strong enough to support a claim to foreign citizenship,
much less a claim to separate statehood, within the federal framework.29 One
can only speculate on the effect on U.S. Indian Law if tribally-identified Americans had acquired protection under international law. As a matter of fact, the
tribal remnants that came to inhabit many states were frequently treated as
denizens (a status in traditional English law falling between citizenship and
alienage) until 1924, when all native-born Americans descended from indigenous tribes were naturalized by act of Congress. Almost a third of those
covered by this Act had not previously been considered to be full American
citizens.3 °
The category of statelessness also covered the descendants of Africans who
entered the country as slaves.3" The great antebellum constitutional scholar,
John Codman Hurd, argued that Negroes had originally entered American
territory not as chattel under local law, but rather as stateless persons who
lacked standing in imperial courts to assert extraterritorial claims against those

26. Chirac v Chirac, 15 US (2 Wheat) 259, 269 (1817).
27. For Marshall's view of the sovereign status of indigenous peoples see Cherokee
Nation v Georgia, 30 US (5 Pet) 1, 15-17 (1831).
28. The legitimacy of British (and later United States) title to its North American
territory was always a troubling matter. For a frank recognition of the anomalies see
Story, Commentaries on the Constitution ch 1 (cited in note 11). For the theoretical
rationale of conquest see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The American Indian in Western Legal
Thought: The Discourses of Conquest (Oxford, 1990).
29. Through much of U.S. history, opportunity for tribally identified individuals to
acquire U.S. citizenship was determined by the treaties and statutes governing state and
federal relations with their tribes. For a comprehensive discussion of recent cases and
developments see Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U Chi L Rev 671 (1989). See also Perry Dane, The Maps of Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 Cardozo L Rev 959 (1991) (discussing issues of sovereignty in
the context of tribal autonomy).
30. See James H. Kettner, The Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 287300 (North Carolina, 1978).
31. For a discussion of the legal difficulties in using "denizenship" to describe the
status of free Negroes in slave states before the Civil War see id at 320-22.
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of slave-ship masters? Although he specifically mentions the existence of
customary slavery among the African tribes, Hurd does not rest his argument
on the comity owed to sovereign African states that recognized slavery. Neither
does he argue that statelessness, as such, is what made Africans subject to
enslavement when they arrived on these shores. 3 Rather, Hurd's point seems
to be that American colonists might have reasonably presumed that Africans
were already slaves at the time of their original purchase by Westerners, and
that there was no recognized body of African positive law under which freshly
enslaved Africans arriving in North America could claim to have been stolen
property that may not be legally resold. 34 This would have eliminated the
need for Hurd to ground North American slavery on either purchase or conquest-the trick could be turned by the extension of comity to the judicial
notice that Portuguese or Dutch law took of repugnant local customs in
Africa.
For Hurd, slavery posed legal and jurisdictional problems very similar to
those posed by polygamy (or other culturally "abhorrent" practices) in a
multicultural world. 3' Like today's multiculturalists, Hurd believed that the
alternative to giving domestic legal recognition to barbaric foreign practices is
a specious universalism that treats one's own particular customs as requirements of natural law. Legal positivism allowed him to ground transnational
law on a respect for cultural diversity without committing him to moral
approval of practices such as slavery. Hurd could thus be antislavery in a
sense, while viewing the compromise between North and South as rooted in
fundamental legal principles. Hurd's treatise thus provides the most coherent
(and hence most troubling) account of how hereditary slavery could continue
to exist in places where there is no recognized legal power of one person to

32. John Codman Hurd, 1 The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States S§
163-68 (Negro Universities, 1968) (original publication Little, Brown, 1858). For a general
discussion, see Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol Dev at 234-39 (cited in note 14). It is worth
taking the trouble to work out Hurd's argument in some detail. His precise claim is that
under imperial law it was a matter of local discretion whether to presume the validity of
the original sale of Africans to the Portuguese and Dutch slavers, a point that was
developed in the administration of formerly Portuguese and Dutch colonies subsequently
acquired by Britain. See Hurd, 1 The Law of Freedom and Bondage at S5 165-66, 170,
243 n 1, 286.
33. See Hurd, 1 The Law of Freedom and Bondage at 5 243 n 1 (cited in note 32).
34. See id at SS 242-44.
35. Kurt Lash notes that beginning with a speech by Charles Sumner in 1853, the
issues of slavery and polygamy were regarded as "twins"; that the Mormon-dominated
government of Utah became pro-slavery before the Civil War in order to identify its cause
with that of the South; that Lincoln himself spoke to the relation between the two issues
in 1857; and that the antipolygamy law could only be passed over Democratic opposition
after the outset of the Civil War. Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Free Exercise
Clause: Religious Exemptions Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 Nw U L Rev 1106,
1125-26 nn 83, 89 (1994). For a discussion of the reasoning of Dred Scott as applied to
the question of polygamy see Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol Dev at 242-44 (cited in note 14).
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originally enslave another.3 6 His answer rests on the notion of comity as a
core principle of transnational private law; it also hinges, however, on his view
that the principles of comity adopted in each forum are a matter of local
positive law and thus can vary from state to state. In resting the presence of
slaves here on the presumed legitimacy of the power to enslave elsewhere,
Hurd sought to explain not merely how slavery could legally exist in places
where it was regarded as a violation of natural law, but also how it could
exist in some such places and not in others. His treatise was thus an indirect
answer to Lincoln's "house divided" speech,37 and also to Taney's unfounded
assumption in Dred Scott3" that to exist anywhere in the United States slavery
must be recognized everywhere in the United States.
The continuation of hereditary slavery under the U.S. Constitution ultimately rested, according to Hurd, on the sublimation of these traditional
questions of private international law into the jurisprudence of federalism. 39
He did not, however, see this as an anomaly in our constitutional development, but as part of its essential character. According to Hurd, the historical
role of the U.S. Supreme Court had been to develop a substantive federal law
based on the nondiscretionary application of the principle of sovereign coequality of states that had been the basis of private international law under the
British Empire.4"
Hurd believed that the 1856 case of Dred Scott advanced this project by
denying both Congress and free states the sovereign power to grant AfricanAmericans federally recognized state citizenship that would have entitled them
to nondiscrimination as sojourners elsewhere under the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article IV of the Constitution.4 1 There had been, for a time,
considerable variation among the states (and some vacillation by them)42 on
the question of whether manumission carried with it naturalization, as it did
in Roman law.43 Also in question was whether free-born Negroes had become
citizens in the states of their birth on the same basis as whites and hence were

36. For a comprehensive treatment of the inadequacy of other explanations see Jonathan A. Bush, Free to Enslave: The Foundations of Colonial American Slave Law, 5 Yale
J L & Human 417 (1993).
37. Abraham Lincoln, A House Divided: Speech Delivered at Springfield, Illinois, at the
Close of the Republican State Convention, June 16, 18S8, in Roy P. Basler, ed, Abraham
Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 372 (World, 1946).
38. Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US (19 How) 393 (1856).
39. Hurd, 1 The Law of Freedom and Bondage chs 2, 7-16, especially S 502-23
(cited in note 32).
40. Id at chs 15-16.
41. See, for example, id at S 371-72, ch 16.
42. Compare Rachael v Walker, 4 Mo 350 (1836) and Scott v Emerson, 15 Mo 576
(1852).
43. The most illuminating discussions of the conceptual relations between emancipation
and rebirth are by Orlando Patterson. See especially, Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social
Death: A Comparative Study (Harvard, 1982), and Orlando Patterson, Freedom: Volume
I: Freedom in the Making of Western Culture (Basic Books, 1991).
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entitled to federal protection as sojourners in other states.
At a federal level these issues were resolved with apparent finality when
the Supreme Court decided in Dred Scott that the Constitution must deny
both Congress and free states the sovereign power to grant federally recognized
state citizenship to African-Americans." The constitutional right to nondiscrimination, according to the Taney Court, was rooted in the constitutional
equality of states-and as long as this meant the constitutional equality of
slave and free states, a free Negro could not be a federally recognized citizen
of any state in which he or she might reside. If a free state could in principle
create rights in a Negro American that would entitle him or her to come
under federal jurisdiction in another state, then any Negro asserting such a
claim would have a procedural right to have a federal court determine whether
it had jurisdiction. Such a conclusion would in the long run have made the
summary enforcement of fugitive slave laws (and ultimately of slave codes) a
practical impossibility.4
The kernel of truth in the Dred Scott opinion was that Marshallian
federalism could only recognize rights in the interstate diaspora that were
traceable to the federally recognized sovereignty of a people. In the fugitive
slave cases the Court had already determined that the interstate diaspora of
slaveholders would be federally protected in the exercise of its state-created
rights. Dred Scott raised the question of whether parallel claims could be made
on behalf of an interstate diaspora of Negroes who asserted their freedom
through the effect of state liberty laws or equivalent federal legislation governing the territories. Giving the federal courts jurisdiction over such claims would
have undermined the scheme of federal protection for slaveholders; but, within
the framework of Marshallian federalism, this was not enough to justify the
asymmetrical treatment of the rights conferred under Southern property laws
and Northern liberty laws. Because he could not argue that slave and free

44. Under Dred Scott slaves could still be freed by the operation of state law in the
sense that the rights of the master were no longer enforceable, but such private manumission was not to be construed as an act of naturalization. See Dred Scott, 60 US at 419.
45. Taney's legal point was in some ways a straightforward extension of that part of
the reasoning of Justice Story in the fugitive slave case of Prigg v Pennsylvania, 41 US (16
Pet) 536 (1842), which denied fugitive slaves due process under the kidnapping laws of
the state in which he or she was captured on grounds of federal constitutional supremacy.
See id at 621-24. Taney, as he indicates in his concurring opinion, would have gone
further in this direction than Story, id at 627 (Taney concurring), and did so in his
opinion in Dred Scott.
Similar issues could arise today regarding the summary deportation of persons
alleged to have entered the United States illegally. To what extent, for example, could
state-created claims to due process undermine the practical ability of the U.S. government
to control its own borders by deporting persons without a full judicial hearing of their
immigration claims? This issue may become more pressing as federal immigration laws are

modified to further limit the procedural rights of persons who may be subject to deportation or refoulement. See, for example, Sale v Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 113 S Ct
2549, 2567 (1993) (Blackmun dissenting).
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states were unequal in their power to confer individual rights, Taney was
constrained to argue that blacks and whites were unequal in their standing to
assert the sovereignty of a people for purposes of federal protection.46
To support such an argument, Taney asserted that no black-free or
slave-had ever been part of a people the sovereignty of which the United
States was bound to recognize, and that neither Congress nor the states had
the power to "naturalize" persons in this condition.47 In Taney's view, naturalization involving recognized transfers of allegiance under international law
was simply an adjunct to the federal power in foreign affairs.48 Accordingly,
naturalized persons would be treated as if they had been born in the United
States under the full protection of its laws. Taney's conceptual leap was to
assume that persons actually born in the United States without the protection
of its laws must be constitutionally ineligible for naturalization. Under the
regime established by Dred Scott, free African-Americans could never have
become U.S. citizens through either naturalization or birth because they were
not eligible for admission to the people who created and possessed the Constitution.49 This reasoning was historically flawed and morally embarrassing, as
Hurd well knew."°
EQUALITY As SOVEREIGNTY
With all its flaws, however, Taney's reasoning in Dred Scott was based on
a view of the principles of 1776 that has many adherents today. This is the view
that constitutional government is essentially an alternative to foreign domination,
and that it expresses the collective right of a sovereign people to self-determination. Unlike other heirs to Jefferson who stress the tension between majority rule
and individual rights, Taney focused on the relation between the state and the
nation. His premise was that, before imposing majority rule on individuals, our
state and federal constitutions were first created by sovereign peoples who
decided thereafter to impose limitations on the powers of the governments thus
created."1 Liberalism, according to Taney, might define the relation of ruler and
ruled within a people, but nationalism (in this case ethno-nationalism) would

46. Dred Scott, 60 US at 404-06.
47. Id at 411-12, 417.
48. Id at 417.
49. This may have been doctrinal overkill; Taney could have reached the same result
by arguing that, even if naturalized, the descendants of slaves were ineligible for federal
constitutional protection.
50. Hurd has many specific criticisms of Dred Scott throughout his treatise, some of
which are to be found in 1 Law of Freedom and Bondage at 558-70 (cited in note 32).
51. Lincoln expressed the same premise in his July 4, 1861, speech to Congress, asking
for endorsement of his use of the War Power to restore the Union. See James G. Randall,
ConstitutionalProblems Under Lincoln 51-59 (Peter Smith, 1963). For a recent defense of
this premise against simple majoritarianism, on the one hand, and "rights foundationalism"
on the other, see Bruce Ackerman, 1 We the People: Foundations (Harvard, 1991).
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create that people and define its boundaries. Membership in the national people
was, according to Taney, essentially a matter of descent, and being of the right
descent was a constitutional precondition for birthright citizenship. 2
The appeal of grounding nondiscrimination everywhere on the claim of a
people to sovereignty somewhere is most clearly apparent in the thought of
Woodrow Wilson, that most idealistic exporter of American ideals to the world.
His internationalism describes a system for enforcing the sovereign coequality of
self-determining peoples. "[A]II peoples and nationalities," he said, "[have a]
right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they
be strong or weak." 3 From an American standpoint, Wilsonian internationalism amounts to an extension of our pre-Civil War constitutional logic in order
to create a new world order out of the breakup of multinational empires. s4
The connections between Wilson's internationalism and his views on preCivil War constitutional history become clear when we consider his background.
Wilson was a child during the Civil War, grew up in the South during Reconstruction, and developed his political views as a leading scholar of American
constitutional development in the antebellum period."s Among the books he

52. Taney argues that negroes "whose ancestors were imported into this country, and
sold as slaves" can never be naturalized as U.S. citizens, even if they are free under state
law. One strand of his argument is that the laws permitting slaves to be imported are
inconsistent with treating such persons as immigrants, and that the power to naturalize
"is, by the well-understood meaning of the word, confined to persons born in a foreign
country, under a foreign Government." See Dred Scott, 60 US at 403, 411, 417-27. A
corollary of Taney's view was that any laws passed by the states for the apparent benefit
of freed slaves were, like the laws of slavery itself, enacted upon "the interest and convenience of the white race." See id at 415. Compare Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood (cited in note 3).
53. Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points, in E. David Cronon, ed, The Political
Thought of Woodrow Wilson 438, 445 (Bobbs-Merrill, 1965) (text of Wilson's January 8,
1918 address to Congress).
54. Wilson's basic principle-a corollary to Jeffersonian self-determination-is that the
relative size or strength of a people should not affect its right to self-determination, and
that a sovereign people should not be expected to internalize the cost of defending its own
borders. This view was, however, supplemented by a requirement that existing borders,
however arbitrary or illegitimate, be preserved under the principle of uti possidetis.
Wilsonian self-determination was thus not to be a basis for revising or violating whatever
international borders might exist. See T. M. Franck, Post-Modern Tribalism and the Right
to Secession, in C. Brolmann, et al, eds, Peoples and Minorities in International Law 3
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1993); and R. Higgins, Comment, in Brolmann, et al, ed, Peoples and
Minorities 29. Akhil Reed Amar develops, a similar argument about American constitutional development in Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U Chi L Rev 483
(1991).
55. See, for example, Woodrow Wilson, Division and Reunion, 1829-1889 (Longmans,
Green, 1900); and Woodrow Wilson, 4-5 A History of the American People (Harper Bros,
1902). The possibility of Northern secession was in fact an option considered by Northern
Abolitionists before the Civil War and reconsidered by some Unionists in response to Dred
Scott. See Phillip S. Paludan, A Covenant With Death: The Constitution, Law, and
Equality in the Civil War Era 79-84 (Illinois, 1975). This perspective is echoed in the
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consulted on this subject during his Princeton years was the treatise by John
Codman Hurd discussed above. s6
Wilson's view of the protection of minority rights in the international system
was essentially a variant of Marshallian federalism as described by Hurd. Here,
as we have seen, the local majority in a state became the virtual representative of
resident out-of-state minorities. This principle was to be enforced in the various
states by the federal courts under their diversity jurisdiction. In Wilsonian
internationalism, however, the main mechanisms of enforcement would be
political rather than judicial. s7 Therefore, the principle of virtual representation
would have to be reversed. Instead of saying that foreign minorities were to be
treated as well as the local majority treated itself, the implicit standard would be
the treatment that foreign majorities accorded to their own minorities. If all
nation-states functioned in world politics as the virtual representatives of their
own peoples in diaspora, then each national state would protect its permanent
minorities out of fear that members of its own people might suffer retaliation
while living as minorities elsewhere. Sovereign peoples with no diaspora were
presumably free of this constraint. But, as Wilson conceived it, the postimperial
relation between national and international politics was in effect a kind of
hostage arrangement based on the tacit acknowledgment that the peoples of the
world were already dispersed, and that their potential ingathering was a fiction
needed to protect their rights wherever they might be. 8
recent work of Allen Buchanan, who argues that it is legitimate to secede from a union
that can only be preserved at the expense of liberal purity. See Allen Buchanan, Secession:
The Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec 34-35
(Westview, 1991).
56. Arthur S. Link, ed, 11 The Papers of Woodrow Wilson 347 (Princeton, 1971).
57. One way to conceive this alternative ideal type of interstate regime would be to
imagine the international system that might have resulted if the Confederacy had successfully negotiated its secession from the federal regime conceived in Dred Scott. Between the
two newly independent successor states-the U.S.A. and the C.S.A.-there would have been
no federal citizenship to protect an individual from discrimination when living in the other
country, and no federal limitation on his own country's ability to retaliate. But the
functions of the federal courts under the Dred Scott regime (and the Fourteenth Amendment system that succeeded it) would be replaced by the equal power of each sovereign
people to threaten national minorities in its midst in order to protect its own co-nationals
living elsewhere. This power would remain effectively equal only on the assumption that
all states were somehow barred from attacks across borders in order to protect their
respective peoples. What would have constituted such a bar in a partitioned United States?
In the optimistic view of Southern secessionists, described at length by Wilson, it would
have been bonds of culture, a common history, treaties, the rules of international law, and
the threat of embargo by the British navy if the North attacked the South.
Wilson's History of the American People, devotes an entire section to what might
have been-the political culture of the Confederacy and the contents of its constitution.
See Wilson, 4 History of the American People ch 5 (cited in note 55). It is particularly
interesting that the federal power within the Confederacy was stronger, and states' rights
weaker, than in the United States. Id at 284. See also Charles Robert Lee, Jr., The
Confederate Constitutions 145-49 (North Carolina, 1963).
58. For a discussion of the implementation of these ideas in the inter-war period see
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As a member of a sovereign people, one would be entitled not merely to rule
as a citizen somewhere, but to live elsewhere as a protected minority. The
distinction between protected (state-possessing) and unprotected (non-statepossessing) internal minorities thus became the basis in domestic politics for the
Wilsonian international order. This meant that those asserting protected minority
status anywhere bad to imagine themselves as hegemonic somewhere else. To
their current oppressors they thus become hypothetical threats (people who could
do the same to us), thereby allowing continuing oppression to be rationalized on
the grounds of self-defense. This is always a danger in asserting otherness as a
counterhegemonic claim. Within a Wilsonian framework, however, the danger is
unavoidable-the sovereign right of each dispersed people to legislate its own
conception of normality at home is the main basis of its claim not to be judged
by the alien standards of its territorial rulers elsewhere.
We might call this claim "Cultural Wilsonianism"-the view that difference
is a trace of sovereignty in a diasporic world. Although Cultural Wilsonianism
can support liberal pluralism in many existing states, it rests on the presumed
right of an ingathered people to exclude and dominate when it can do so without
foreign interference. Culture wars are virtually inevitable when claims to equality
must always be articulated as demands for sovereignty.
Perhaps the most glaring limitation of Wilson's vision of world order was
that a minority that was not sovereign anywhere would be legally subject to
discrimination everywhere without any protection from the international system.s9 Subnational groups-groups with no state of their own--could thus be
deported, expelled, or forcibly removed to other territories (even those still living
in their traditional homelands, such as the Kurds and Armenians). And stateless
groups in diaspora, such as Jews and African-Americans, could be denied
ordinary civil and political rights in any country with little or no protection from
the international system. Although these ideas were an important source of
Nazism in Germany and apartheid in South Africa-both products of the
interwar period-they were not unusual. In many societies during this period,
intergroup conflicts were addressed by creating new categories of internal
foreigners-domestic aliens whose legal immunities and privileges were at best
temporary and revocable."0
Inis L. Claude, National Minorities: An International Problem (Harvard, 1955); Charles S.
Maier, Unsafe Haven, 207 New Republic 20 (Oct 12, 1992).

59. If the civil rights of a person in any state would depend upon whether he or she
was part of a people that had a state of its own, then peoples without sovereignty could

be consigned to the status of denizens wherever they were allowed to live on the
sufferance of the local majority. This was the future as domestic aliens that John Codman
Hurd foresaw for detribalized Indians and freed slaves if the U.S. Civil War had not
occurred in the aftermath of Dred Scott. See Hdrd, 1 The Law of Freedom and Bondage
chs 11-13 especially at S§ 434, 445 (cited in note 32); John Codman Hurd, 2 The Law
of Freedom and Bondage in the United States 5 195 n 1 (Negro Universities, 1968)
(original publication Little, Brown, 1858). See also Kettner, The Development of American
Citizenship at 313, 319-20 (cited in note 30).

60: Jews were widely regarded as the minority to end all minorities in the Wilsonian
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In a Wilsonian world, cultural minorities thus have little choice but to
demand political autonomy whenever the states in which they live give up the
pretense of multiculturalism. In the words of one scholar, "[t]he effort of the
state to become a nation aroused the determination of the nation to become a
state." 6 ' The underlying problem is that the demand for cultural autonomy is
iterative; any national group asserting it should be prepared to confront a
parallel demand asserted by the subnational groups that it comes to rule.62 But
if the point of demanding separate statehood is to express the cultural aspirations
of a national people, then abstract consistency cannot require a national people
to allow its achieved aspirations to be frustrated by the presence of cultural
minorities in its midst. It follows that a national people does not violate
Wilsonian principles by resisting (at least up to a point) attempts at self-help by
separatist minority groups that threaten to strand members of the dominant culture. Wilsonian internationalism may have a bias against the use of international
war for purposes of national (or ethnic) unification, but it has no bias against the
use of force to preserve national unity against a separatist threat."
These intrinsic difficulties are apparent in Wilson's effort to construct a basis
for world peace through the application of democratic theory to the interstate
context. When he asserted the right of all peoples to self-government, Wilson
understood that any state created to allow a previously subjugated minority to
rule as a majority would almost inevitably have permanent minorities of its own.
Yet he saw in the relations among such states a system for protecting internationally recognized internal minorities from discrimination. In such a system the
power to threaten internal minorities without foreign interference was the
principal mechanism, implicitly legitimate, by which each sovereign people could

system. In virtually every new state founded on the national principle, there were new outbreaks of anti-Semitism, rooted in the need to ground citizenship on some exclusive
national identity. As Hannah Arendt points out, the treatment of the Jews was merely a
paradigmatic case of the problems of any subnational group that had no sovereign
homeland-they were the quintessential non-deportable group to whom almost anything
could be done during the interwar period. See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism ch 9 (Harcourt Brace, 1973).
61. Claude, National Minorities at 9 (cited in note 58).
62. For a discussion of this point see Michael Walzer, Nation and Universe, in Grethe
B. Peterson, ed, 11 The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 507 (Utah, 1990). See also
Michael Walzer, Between Nation and World, 328 Economist 49 (September 11, 1993)
(special supplement, "The Future Surveyed"). Compare Amitai Etzioni, The Evils of SelfDetermination, 89 Foreign Pol 21 (Winter 1992-93).
63. The philosopher Bernard Williams explains this in Wilsonian terms:
What the breakaway group claimed, after all, was the right to set up a culturally
homogeneous state. This may commit the breakaway state to accepting the right of
some minority to do the same thing, if they can; but if the minority cannot do
that, it does not necessarily commit the new state to respect their rights to cultural
self-expression, in the middle of what was precisely intended to be a culturally
unitary state.
Bernard Williams, Left-Wing Wittgenstein, Right-Wing Marx, 1 Common Knowledge 33,
41-42 (Spring 1992).
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protect oppressed co-nationals living elsewhere. The explicitly illegitimate
mechanism, by contrast, was unilateral military intervention across borders. To
enforce this contrast there had to be a credible multilateral commitment to
protect weak states from military threats by their stronger neighbors. Otherwise,
sovereign peoples, great and small, would not have an equal right to retaliate
against internal minorities when co-nationals were endangered elsewhere.
A major goal of Wilson's interstate system was to contain civil wars that
might develop into international wars. He thus regarded it as especially important that treaties protecting the rights of minorities within states be enforceable
by multilateral action rather than direct military intervention by kin-states." In
a Wilsonian world in which international military interventions would be
prohibited by agreement of the great powers, civil strife on both sides of an
international border was to become the dominant and permissible form of permanent conflict.6" This was the price (if not the meaning) of peace.
II. Survival and Recovery
Wilsonian internationalism is not, however, the only strand of U.S. constitutional theory that has implications for world politics. We have acquired other,
perhaps deeper, national ideals as a result of our own experience of the Civil
War. For us, the demand for political equality is no longer merely the trace of a
claim to sovereignty by an autonomous people; we also think that sovereignty
itself is valuable mainly as a means to achieve the kind of equality that can come
from reuniting a divided people.
Since Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, America has stood for the possibility
that a living constitution can be persuasively reinterpreted as a result of national
trauma." "Posttraumatic" constitutions, as we may call them, can take a
variety of forms: Some are repressive, some are punitive, and some are based on
a widespread denial of the past. Such a constitution will be liberal to the degree
that it goes beyond victors' justice by foregrounding common survivorship as a
bond uniting the victims and perpetrators of the historic atrocities that formed
the nation. The forward-looking Lincoln (the Lincoln we remember) lifts the
nation above the unendurable cycle of guilt and recrimination by imagining the

64. The preferred mechanisms for correcting excesses of popular sovereignty within the

newly created states would be the further multiplication of states, the adjustment of
borders with neighboring states, and the transfer of populations. Ethnic conflicts within
states might then be superseded by international enforcement of the principle of nonaggression between them.
65. For a provocative reflection on the post-Cold War world see Hans Magnus
Enzensberger, .Civil Wars: From L.A. to Bosnia (New Press, 1993).
66. There has been a recent renewal of interest in the significance of Lincoln's
Gettysburg Address in transforming American politics. See, for example, Garry Wills,
Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America (Simon & Schuster, 1992). The
view presented in this Article of the constitutional significance of Lincoln's stance on
American history does not, to my knowledge, appear elsewhere in the literature.
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United States as a nation in recovery from trauma in a way that anticipates the
moral logic of today's personal recovery programs. Like a modern psychotherapist, Lincoln moves us from being unwilling perpetrators of evil to the recognition that we are all victims, to the common national identity of survivors.67
The real Lincoln is, of course, a complex figure whose prewar views were
tempered by political expediency, and whose postwar aspirations can only be
inferred from his conduct during the last few weeks of his life.68 There is,
moreover, ample evidence that his war aims changed in the months before
Gettysburg from the restoration of a union to the rebirth of a nation."' In
structuring my argument around a rhetorical opposition between received
Lincolnian and Wilsonian positions, I am admittedly exaggerating some features
of the thought of Lincoln and Wilson and suppressing others. My Lincoln is in
part a reflection of the image of slavery and the task of Reconstruction in the
works of Robert Cover, Garry Wills, and Akhil Amar;7 my Wilson is a reflection of the image of cultural self-determination in the works of Charles Taylor,
Martha Minow, and many postmodern exponents of cultural politics." Put
crudely, I am here using Lincoln and Wilson to stand for a distinction between
a constitutional politics based on identification (with its attendant possibility of
a national rebirth into a new identity) and a constitutional politics of representation (with its implication that pre-existing identities are fixed, or have become
so and require recognition).72
67. See, for example, Ellen Bass and Laura Davis, The Courage to Heal: A Guide for
Women Survivors of Child Sexual Abuse (Harper Perennial, 1992). Compare Wendy
Kaminer, I'm Dysfunctional, You're Dysfunctional. The Recovery Movement and Other
Self-Help Fashions (Addison-Wesley, 1992).
68. The "Lincoln myth" and the debate over his true motives are well-discussed in J.
David Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion:Remaking American Liberalism ch 1 (Princeton,
1993).
69. See William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction 35-36 (Peter Smith,
1963); and James M. McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution
viii and ch 4 (Oxford, 1990). See also Herman Belz, Reconstructing the Union: Theory
and Policy During the Civil War (Cornell, 1969). A considerable amount of reconstruction
was carried out in the Union-occupied portions of the Confederacy during the war (as
well as in some of the border states that never seceded). The conditions imposed upon
reconquered areas raised issues of constitutional significance for both sides. Sometimes
these conditions were more, and sometimes less, stringent than might have been imposed
once total victory was assured. See generally, Belz, Reconstructing the Union. See also,
Eben Greenough Scott, Reconstruction During the Civil War in the United States of
America (Houghton, Mifflin, 1895).
70. See Martha Minow, et al, eds, Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of
Robert Cover (Michigan, 1992); Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg (cited in note 66); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L J 1193
(1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 106 Harv L Rev 124 (1992).
71. See Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition" (Princeton,
1992); Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American
Law (Cornell, 1990).
72. These two divergent conceptions of American liberalism bear some relation to the
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With this caveat I wish to describe a Lincolnian view of American constitutional development as one that foregrounds national trauma as a unifying
experience, and that seeks to replace the moral logic of victim and perpetrator
with the moral logic of common survivorship and collective rebirth. I am not
prepared to argue that this Lincolnian view is ultimately less troubling than the
Wilsonian alternative.
My point is rather that Lincoln's recasting of the Jeffersonian legacy-especially in the Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural Address-is
different from Wilson's, and that it constitutes an important element in our
constitutional tradition that is also relevant to world politics today. At Gettysburg, Lincoln introduced a note of subtle ambivalence into his concluding reprise
of the Jeffersonian principle of popular self-determination (government of, by,
and for the people) that was the basis of Southern secession. As he speaks, that
very principle is threatening to kill a form of government dedicated to the
achievement of equality as an aspirational goal. Americans, he declares, must
rededicate themselves to the "unfinished work" of human equality so that
Jeffersonian democracy "shall not perish from the earth." 73
It is Lincoln's sense of national survival and rebirth that empowers him at
Gettysburg to reverse the order of ideas in Jefferson's Declaration of Independence. In a'reborn United States, Lincoln suggests, liberty is no longer asserted
as an inalienable right, but as a preconception (we were "conceived in Liberty");
just as important, the basic presupposition of natural rights theory-Jefferson's
notion that "all men are created equal"-becomes for Lincoln a "proposition"
to which "this nation" must "now" affirmatively rededicate itself.74
Why us? Why now? Lincoln's implicit answer to these questions evokes the
perspective of "the world," an international context in which our Civil War was
already a notable event.' He had long believed that slavery "deprives our

nineteenth century differences between Whig/Republicans, on the one hand, and Jacksonian
Democrats on the other, that are discussed in works such as Greenstone, The Lincoln
Persuasion (cited in note 68) and Lawrence Fredrick Kohl, The Politics of Individualism:
Parties and the American Character in the Jacksonian Era (Oxford, 1989). Unlike those
writers, however, I do not base my interpretation on the cultural and ethical ramifications
of the distinction between positive and negative liberty. Compare Two Concepts of
Liberty, in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty 118 (Oxford, 1969). I agree, however,
with Greenstone's general view that "although the central tenets of American liberalism are
widely shared, they are interpreted in different ways. And these differences of interpretation may be of fundamental rather than secondary importance." J. David Greenstone,
Political Culture and American Political Development: Liberty, Union, and the Liberal
Bipolarity, 1 Stud Am Pol Dev 1, 28 (1986). For a particularly nuanced view of Lincoln's
conception of liberty see McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution chs 3, 7 (cited in note 69).
73. See Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg November 19, 1863, in Basler, ed, Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings
734 (cited in note 37).
74. See Lincoln, Gettysburg Address at 734 (cited in note 73).
75. Id.

140

Roundtable

[3:121

republican example of its just influence in the world" which would ultimately
inspire "all lovers of liberty everywhere" to embrace the egalitarian principles of
our Declaration of Independence." At Gettysburg, Lincoln implies that the
commitment to human equality can and will survive the European defeats of
1848 and be reborn in the United States." Our Civil War, he says, is really a
test of whether "any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure" in
78
a counterrevolutionary world.
What is the moral logic of the perspective that I am choosing to call
Lincolnian?" In the first instance, it essentially denies that the constitutional
problem of the Civil War is how to fit the Negro into the framework of competing sovereigns on which our system is based. Such is the Southern (and
Wilsonian) perspective on the conflict-a view that already concedes that partition could be a mutually agreeable alternative to the union of North and South,
and that (on suitable terms) expulsion could be a plausible alternative to emancipation for the African-American. In the early 1850s, Lincoln, also, displayed an
80
"inability to imagine a biracial future for America if the black race were free."
He thus embraced for a time the plan of the American Colonization Society to
resettle freed slaves in Africa. 8 Fortunately for Lincoln's future reputation, only
one of his speeches on this subject survives, even though until his death he
apparently viewed the colonization of emancipated slaves as a legitimate postwar outcome. The Lincoln we remember stands for the rejection of this view.
From this received Lincolnian perspective on the U.S. Civil War the problem
is slavery, not sovereignty. Slavery is, moreover, a national problem-a problem
for both North and South, for both black and white. The precise nature of that
problem, however, is not necessarily to set things right for the individual victims
of enslavement, but rather to help the entire nation recover from what pop
psychologists might call its toxic guilt.83
76. Abraham Lincoln, Peoria Speech, October 16, 1854, cited in Mark Neely, Jr., The
Last Best Hope of Earth: Abraham Lincoln and the Promise of America 37-38 (Harvard,

1993).
77. This event had led many prominent refugees to immigrate to the United States.
Lincoln was highly aware that the influx of immigrants had precipitated the crisis of the
party system of the 1850s, although, as Tyler Anbinder points out, the bulk of the immigration from Germany in the 1850s was probably caused by potato blight rather than
political defeat. See Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings
and the Politics of the 1850s 7-8 (Oxford, 1992).
78. See Lincoln, Gettysburg Address at 734 (cited in note 73).
79. Although I do not closely follow their interpretations of Lincoln, I am indebted to
Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg (cited in note 66) and Greenstone, The Lincoln Persuasion
(cited in note 68). In revising this essay for publication I have benefited from McPherson,

Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (cited in note 69).
80. Neely Jr., The Last Best Hope at 40 (cited in note 76). Neely's discussion of this
issue is quite perceptive. See id at 34-42.
81. See Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction at 91-92 (cited in note 69).
82. See id at 91-94. For less conclusive, but more disturbing evidence see Belz,
Reconstructing the Union at 282 (cited in note 69).
83. See, for example, John Bradshaw, Healing the Shame that Binds You (Health
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For Lincoln himself, of course, the problem of redemption from national
4
guilt was a secular version of the Pauline problem of enslavement to sin. He
said as much in his Second Inaugural Address, and in the Gettysburg Address he
described the meaning of the Civil War--our new birth of freedom-as a rebirth
5
from what St. Paul might have called our national enslavement to slavery."
Lincoln knew that abolitionists had also used this imagery and he appropriated
it to represent our Civil War as one to free the Union from its own slavery, its
own original sin. 6 Lincoln's Gettysburg Address became, in effect, our national
survivor story, and his Second Inaugural Address became a national recovery
program from the near-death experiences of slavery and the Civil War.
This was more than a rhetorical gesture. Lincoln succeeded in raising the
U.S. Civil War to a higher moral plane than other wars over sectional selfdetermination by identifying the Union itself as the victim of slavery and the war
as the Union's struggle for redemption and rebirth. 7 He believed that the

Communications, 1988); Charles L. Whitfield, Healing the Child Within: Discovery and
Recovery for Adult Children of Dysfunctional Families (Health Communications, 1987).
84. Paul's conception of rebirth and immortality as freedom from our enslavement to
sin is most fully explained in Romans 6. This idea is somewhat easier to grasp if we
consider it to be a spiritual counterpart to the secular law of slavery and freedom in the
Roman Empire. As Orlando Patterson points out, Paul's mission to the Gentiles was
largely among the community of freed slaves who owed the expansion of their personal
liberty to the growing sovereignal liberty of the Emperor, Caesar Augustus, and his
successors. Ordinary slaves who were redeemed or ransomed "for a price" would have
been indentured to their redeemer until the lien could be repaid (This was the institution
of the postliminium). They would be expected to glorify the master who freed them, and
to become slaves to no other man. Patterson, Freedom at 331 (cited in note 43). Perhaps
this is what Paul has in mind when he says, "whoever was called in the Lord as a slave
is a freed person belonging to the Lord, just as whoever was free when called is a slave
of Christ." I Corinthians 7:22.
In the present context we should note that, if the Old Testament Jews constitute the
first "survivor story," the New Testament Church constitutes the first "recovery movement." Its "saving remnant" of recovered sinners conceived itself to be a spiritual
community that transcended cultural divisions and political boundaries. Political survivorship, ever since, has generally been linked to broader claims of spiritual recovery. As
vehicles of spiritual recovery, survivor stories are implicitly transcendental (a church), even
when they also bear the weight of demands for territorial sovereignty (a state).
85. Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1865, in Basler, ed,
Abraham Lincoln: His Speeches and Writings 792-93 (cited in note 37). Orlando Patterson
reminds us that Paul's Epistle to the Romans uses slavery as a metaphor for sin itself, and
that Paul's theology of redemption tracks the logic of the Roman law of manumission. See
Patterson, Freedom chs 18-19 (cited in note 43).
86. See Paludan, A Covenant with Death at 79-84 (cited in note 55). In fact, this
imagery was the basis of the movement for Northern secessionism after Dred Scott.
87. As England's principal suppliers of cotton, the Confederate states hoped for military
support from the foreign powers that depended on it. Their strategy was in some ways
similar to that of Kuwait in gaining foreign support against Sadaam Hussein's effort to
reunify Iraq through military action. Lincoln's decision to free the slaves, however,
effectively eliminated whatever sentiment there was in England for interfering with his

142

Roundtable

[3:121

reborn Union could itself become the survivor of slavery, and that the brutal
cycle of victim and perpetrator could be finally broken. By asserting a moral
basis of national renewal that transcended mere nationalism, Lincoln distinguished himself from Old World contemporaries, such as Bismarck and Cavour,
who overcame both sectionalist and foreign claims to "reunify" their nations by
means that were sometimes violent.88
The Lincolnian idea of nondiscrimination as the identification of the entire
nation with the historical victims of human rights abuse is the country's second
important contribution to world political thought, rivaling John Marshall's discovery of a legal basis for nondiscrimination in the principles of interstate
comity. Several important features of the Lincolnian survivor model of nondiscrimination are worth stressing as a contrast to the sojourner model, not all of
which were realized by Lincoln himself.
The first point is, as we have seen, that the moral logic of survivorship
operates through a mechanism of identification rather than representation. For
Lincoln's survivor story to do its healing work, victims and perpetrators of past
abuse must not regard themselves as different peoples for whom independence
(or secession) is one plausible path to reconciliation. Rather, the perpetrator
identifies with the victim so that the victim can identify with the perpetrator.
When each successfully internalizes the other, the burden of guilt is shared. In a
post-Reconstruction America, black and white, South and North, would cease to
regard each other as victims and perpetrators; all would become survivors of
slavery and of the war to end it. 9 The end of the story is the unity rather than
the autonomy of victims and perpetrators. Lincoln's survivor story, however,
efforts to reunify the United States by force. For a brief account of the role of foreign
recognition in the Confederate war plan see Stephen John Stedman, The End of the
American Civil War, in Roy Licklider, ed, Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End 164,
177-78 (New York, 1993).

88. For a provocative comparison between Lincoln and such figures as Bismarck and
Cavour, see Carl N. Degler, One Among Many: The United States and National Unification 89-119 in Gabor S. Boritt, ed, Lincoln the War President ch 4 (Oxford, 1992).

For a historical treatment of Bismarck and Cavour see Otto Pflanze, 2 Bismarck and the
Development of Germany (Princeton, 1962); Denis Mack Smith, Cavour (Knopf, 1985);

Massimo Salvadori, Cavour and The Unification of Italy (Van Nostrand, 1961).

89. The specific character of the slaves' experience is thus officially denied in a way
that may reproduce some of the effects that we now associate with posttraumatic stress
disorder, particularly depression, numbing of general responsiveness, anxiety, isolation, and
hypervigilance. These symptoms are described in DSM-IV and discussed in many places.
See American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 4th ed 1994) (DSM-IV). For a comprehensive
collection see John P. Wilson and Beverly Raphael, eds, International Handbook of
Traumatic Stress Syndromes (Plenum, 1993). For a brief discussion see Tom Williams,
Diagnosis and Treatment of Survivor Guilt: The Bad Penny Syndrome, in John P. Wilson,

et al, eds, Human Adaptation to Extreme Stress: From the Holocaust to Vietnam 319
(Plenum 1988); and Kathy K. Swink and Antoinette E. Leveille, From Victim to Survivor:
A New Look at the Issues and Recovery Process for Adult Incest Survivors, 8 Women
and Therapy 119 (1986).
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effectively blurs the distinction between uniting North and South and uniting
black and white. This, as we shall see, is a problem that plagues his would-be
successors to this day.
The second point is that the moral logic of Lincoln's survivor story puts
former victims and former perpetrators on an equal moral footing so that they
can survive together in the same place. To break the cycle of victimization, the
historical victims of abuse are morally expected to dedicate themselves to the
proposition that peace is victory enough.90 Either party to the peace can then be
equally accused of refighting the Civil War by returning to its former role of
victim or perpetrator.
A third feature of Lincoln's story of national survival is that it expresses and,
to a degree rewards, ambivalence about past victims, living and dead.91 This is
different from the view of national recovery taken by such figures as Thaddeus
Stevens and Charles Sumner, who thought of Reconstruction as a way to
complete the conquest of the South by the North through a partial role reversal
of blacks and whites.92 At Gettysburg, Lincoln honors "those who here gave
their lives that that nation might live"93 in words that have made the reborn nation consciously ambivalent about its near-death experience of slavery and Civil
War.94 For Lincoln the central point is that, together, we survived an experience
that almost killed us, a theme to which he returns in his Second Inaugural
Address in urging "malice toward none [and] charity for all."' This morally

90. The therapeutic advantages and limitations of the transition from victimhood to
survival are an important dimension of the nonviolence of Gandhi and Martin Luther
King. See Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence
(W.W. Norton, 1969); M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments
with Truth (Jonathan Cape, 1966) (Mahadev Desai, trans).
91. Illuminating discussions of the pairing of slavery and death and emancipation and
rebirth are contained in Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (cited in note 43) and
Patterson, Freedom (cited in note 43).
92. See, for example, Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction at 76-77, 121-22,
136 (cited in note 69); Scott, Reconstruction During the Civil War at 268-72 (cited in
note 69). For a broader account of the views of Stevens and Sumner see Eric Foner,
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 228-39 (Harper & Row,
1988).
93. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address at 734 (cited in note 73).
94. "The survivor is one who has come into contact with death in some bodily or
psychic fashion and remained alive." Robert J. Lifton, From Hiroshima to the Nazi
Doctors: The Evolution of Psycboformative Approaches to UnderstandingTraumatic Stress
Syndromes, in Wilson and Raphael, eds, InternationalHandbook 11, 16 (cited in note 89).
To identify oneself as a survivor is (from both a psychoanalytic and a moral point
of view), to bring the idea of death into one's life in order to be reconciled to one's
ambivalence about both. See generally Norman 0. Brown, Life Against Death: The
PsychoanalyticalMeaning of History (Wesleyan, 1959).
95. Lincoln, Second InauguralAddress at 792, 793 (cited in note 85). "Fondly do we
hope-fervently do we pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away.
Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth piled by the bond-man's two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood
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grounded resistance to continuing the Civil War by other means distinguishes
Lincoln's model of national recovery from those competing views in which past
victims continue to be represented, as such, in the future. For Lincoln, national
recovery is rooted in the ambivalent wish to remember a painful history without
being reminded of it.
A fourth, and related, point is that the goal of Lincoln's story of national
survival is not reparations, but rather a new beginning-a new covenant between
former victim and the former perpetrator (who thus become equally capable of
breaching it). America's national recovery from its collective trauma requires a
collective pledge to remember the past in order to avoid repeating it-a limbic
state that honors ambivalence about the necessary stages of our moral development as a nation.
This leads us to a fifth point: when a repetition of the historical pattern
occurs, the wrong is a breach of this new covenant. We have in effect repeated
the past in order to avoid remembering it. Identifying the wrong in this way
allows us to distinguish between a Lincolnian liberalism of national recovery and
those generic forms of liberalism that do not take traumatic history into account.
In a generically liberal society based on free expression, giving offense through
the expression of ideas must be broadly tolerated (although the Millian tendency
to treat such expression as harmless symbolism gives too little recognition of the
mental distress it may cause).96
But in a society recovering from slavery there may be a specifically cognizable wrong in the intentional reenactment-however symbolic-of the role of an
historic oppressor in a manner that forces the role of the victim on persons with
historical reasons to fear it. The moral logic of Lincoln's survivor story would
suggest that "the intentional trapping of a captive audience of blacks in order to
subject them to face-to-face degradation," might be proscribed as "temporary
involuntary servitude, a sliver of slavery."97 To view the symbolic act of repetition as merely offensive behavior is to deny the continuing presence of the past,
not merely in memory, but also in the construction of identity. The fact that our
traumatic history of slavery is not behind us (and that we are constitutionally
enjoined to avoid its repetition) is essential to understanding what is wrong with
any replication of the pattern and practice of racial subordination, even through
speech. At least part of the potential harm done by such a wrong is a return to
the original trauma, a recovered memory of historical victimization.

drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three
thousand years ago, so still it must be said 'the judgments of the Lord, are true and righteous altogether.'" Id at 793.
96. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Marshall Cohen, ed, The Philosophy of John
Stuart Mill: Ethical, Political and Religious 185 (Modern Library, 1961); H.L.A. Hart,
Law, Liberty, and Morality 77-83 (Oxford, 1963); Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom
of Expression, 1 Phil & Pub Aff 204 (1972); Joel Feinberg, Offense to Others: The Moral
Limits of Criminal Law (Oxford, 1985).
97. Amar, 106 Harv L Rev at 158 (cited in note 70).
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It follows, as a sixth point, that what distinguishes historical repetition from
other forms of offensive or distressing expression is not the magnitude of the
harm (which may or may not be greater), but its source. A reiteration of patterns
and symbols of enslavement (which are not slavery itself) can induce a repetition
of the internalized trauma of slavery in the unconscious-where remembering
and reliving are indistinguishable, and where slavery may never have been
abolished or set right." This suggests that a heightened awareness of the patterns and symbols of enslavement-itself a product of liberation-can actually
increase the harm of racial discrimination, while also being a necessary stage in
identifying the wrong."
A.

SURVIVORSHIP AND VICTIMHOOD

We have now reached the moment, however, where we must acknowledge
that there are at least two possible variants of Lincoln's survivor story, each of
which carries its own interpretation of what it means to be a nation in recovery.
The first is the variant that allows former perpetrators to identify themselves as
victims in order to become survivors. This is the variant that promises "to bind
up the nation's wounds"' 0 by placing the North and South on an equal moral
footing as survivors of slavery and the war to end it. A second variant requires
former perpetrators to both identify with their victims and to see themselves
from their victims' point of view. This is the variant that sees the war itself as
recompense for "every drop of blood drawn with the lash.'' These two
variants introduce a profound ambiguity in their depiction of who the historical
victims are (slaves or Southerners) and of what would trigger a traumatic
memory of the past (racism or the accusation of racism).
Although both variants depend upon a mutuality of identification, they differ
significantly in how the new collective identity is defined. In the first variant, the
healing comes through a dedication (for Lincoln, a rededication) to a set of
higher principles originally embodied in the Declaration of Independence. In the
second variation, the scourge of war atones for the national sin of slavery.
Superficially, the latter claim resembles the abolitionist (and Radical Republican)
idea that the victory of the Union Army represents an apocalyptic judgment on
the sin of the South.' In Lincoln's rendition, however, the suffering. of the
98. This may be what Guyora Binder has in mind in Guyora Binder, The Slavery of
Emancipation, Cardozo L Rev (forthcoming).
99. The Freudian literature on dominance and submission is relevant here. So too is
the Marxian literature on exploitation and material reproduction. At their root, both
literatures are grounded in our ambivalent desires to both dominate and submit, to both
gain and lose, and reflect the ways in which this ambivalence is perverted and exploited
to allow gains and losses to flow into different "accounts." For a further discussion of
these points see Robert Meister, Beyond Satisfaction, 15 Topoi (September 1996) (forthcoming).
100. Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address at 793 (cited in note 85) (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. According to Ernest Lee Tuveson, Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address is consistent
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Union Army meant that the sin of slavery had been assumed by the North,
implying that through this sacrifice the nation as a whole might be cleansed and
°3
reborn in the manner suggested by the first variant.
For a brief moment before his death, Lincoln thus achieved a shaky synthesis
of both variants of mutual identification described above into a single narrative
of survival and recovery. The genius of his Second Inaugural Address (crystallized
in his own martyrdom and later legend) was to merge the Biblical language of
judgment and retribution with that of sacrifice, forgiveness, and renewal. After
quoting the passage "Woe unto the world because of offences!"," ° Lincoln
insists that God "gives to both North and South, this terrible war, as the woe
due to those by whom the offence came."'0 5 His well-known conclusion is not,
however, that the post-war world will be a living hell-the final judgment of a
righteous God on a sinful nation.' Rather than describing the aftermath of
war as a deserved punishment for sin, Lincoln suggests that the living are the
undeserving beneficiaries of the sacrifice of those who (as he said at Gettysburg)
"gave their lives that [the] nation might live.""0 7 A Lincolnian attitude of "malice toward none" and "charity for all" is appropriate for a once-guilty people
who have been forgiven through a redeeming act of grace.'
Viewed as a peace strategy, Lincoln's national survivor story provided a
moral framework under which many in the defeated South could accept a
Northern victory as something other than a humiliating punishment for slavery
and secession. 9 In Lincoln's vision, the vicarious sacrifice of the innocent dead

with the abolitionist view, represented by Julia Ward Howe's "Battle Hymn of the
Republic," that the Civil War was an inevitable act of divine judgment that redeemed the
American nation from the sin of slavery and allowed it to resume its millennial mission
of saving the world. See Tuveson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial
Role 197-202, 206-07 (Chicago, 1968). Garry Wills, however, sharply distinguishes Lincoln's use of Biblical imagery, in the Second Inaugural Address and elsewhere, from
Howe's: "Lincoln's distinctive mark . . . was his refusal to indulge in triumphalism, righteousness, or vilification of the foe ....
Nothing could be farther from the crusading
righteousness of Julia Ward Howe in her 'Battle Hymn of the Republic.'" Lincoln at
Gettysburg at 183-84 (cited in note 66). For further discussion of Lincoln's distinctive use
of Biblical imagery, see Garry Wills, Under God 207-21 (Simon & Schuster, 1990).

103. For a discussion of the vicarious sacrifice of Christ in pre-Civil War American
theology see Ann Douglas, The Feminization of American Culture ch 4 (Alfred K. Knopf,
1977). For an argument that the Puritan jeremiad was a distinctively American ritual of
consensus, see Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad 132-175 (Wisconsin, 1978).
104. Matthew 18:7.
105. Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address at 793 (cited in note 85) (emphasis added).
106. This was in fact the view that many Southerners took of their impending defeat.
See, for example, Richard E. Beringer, et al, Why the South Lost the Civil War 393
(Georgia, 1986).
107. Lincoln, Gettysburg Address at 734 (cited in note 73).
108. Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address at 793 (cited in note 85).
109. Compare Kenneth M. Stampp, The Southern Road to Appomattox, in The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background of the Civil War 246 (Oxford, 1980); Beringer, et
al, Why the South Lost the Civil War 368-397 (cited in note 106); and Stedman, The
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would allow former enemies to live together, cheek-by-jowl, under a common
government without engaging in an endless cycle of mutual reprisal and recrimination over the past.
The prospect of former enemies living in the same place under one government is a problem for peacemakers in any civil war. To the extent that this
prospect is unthinkable, a final peace is also unthinkable."' The argument that
surrender will lead to severe retaliation, or even genocide, has always been used
by wartime leaders to make the losing side fight on, especially when it knows
that its aims and conduct in the war are seen as morally reprehensible by its enemy."' This was certainly the view that many Southern leaders took of the
consequences of defeat. Exhorting his troops in November 1863, Lee said: "'[A]
cruel enemy seeks to reduce our fathers and our mothers, our wives and our children, to abject slavery, to strip them from their homes. Upon you these helpless
ones rely.'"' 2 From this perspective the only honorable peace was a negotiated
settlement that preserved the capacity of both sides to make war, and thus
3
ratified, at least implicitly, the existence of two nations."
Lincoln's story of national survival presents the alternative vision of how a
civil war can end."" As the war progressed, Lincoln came to believe the only
proper end to total war is total peace;"' that such peace requires both surrender by one side and forgiveness by the other; and that such forgiveness is in
part an act of identification-if not with the guilt of the former enemy, at least
with the shame.
This is a complex view, with moral and psychological dimensions that can
only be briefly sketched within the scope of the present Article. The philosopher

End of the American Civil War 164-87 (cited in note 87). See also Richard E. Beringer,
et al, The Elements of Confederate Defeat: Nationalism, War Aims, and Religion chs 1215 (Georgia, 1988).
110. The range of conceivable outcomes are a fight to the death, a negotiated partition
backed by the power to resume fighting, or de facto secession through continuing military
stalemate between rebel and government forces. See Roy Licklider, The Consequences of
Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945-1993, 89 Am Pol Sci Rev 681 (1995).
111. This argument has been used in wars of empire, as well as in civil wars, and by
leaders as diverse as Pericles and Hitler. See Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg at 182-83 (cited
in note 66).
112. Jonathan Truman Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson: The
Restoration of the Confederates to the Rights and Privileges, 1861-1898 37 (North Carolina, 1953).
113. See generally Stedman, The End of the American Civil War 164-87 (cited in note
87).
114. The discussion in this paragraph draws on Fred C. IlE, Every War Must End 95105 (Columbia, 1971); Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and
Defeat part 1 (Stanford, 1958); Stedman, The End of the American Civil War 164-87
(cited in note 87); and Licklider, The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements (cited in

note 110). See also Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty (cited in note 112).
115. See James McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution ch

4 (cited in note 69).
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Bernard Williams tells us that shame internalizes the figure of the watcher and
that "[tihe root of shame lies in ... being at a disadvantage: in what I shall call,
in a very general phrase, a loss of power. The sense of shame is a reaction of the
subject to the consciousness of that loss.."116 To identify with the shame of
those whom we have defeated is to be embarrassed for them; we empathize with
their feeling of political nakedness before our gaze. Gandhi captures the difference between this feeling and its alternatives-righteous anger and abject
fear-when he asks us each to imagine that the thief whom we have surprised in
the night turned out to be our own father." 7 By identifying with our father's
shame, Gandhi suggests, we step outside the categories of victim and perpetrator-the endless cycle of abuse-and find a truth in the situation that permits the
transformation of our relationship and the creation of a new bond between
118

US.

One cannot write these words today without noticing the difference between
the moral attitude that Gandhi intended to evoke with his example of the thief,
and the apparently typical moral attitude of those who "recover" the memory
that their childhood sexual abuser was their father. Here the element of incestuous erotic identification is part of what makes the relationship abusive (although
one assumes that this would be true at the level of the unconscious even if the
abuser were someone else). The recent literature on recovered memory insists
that rage at the abuser is the appropriate moral response, and frequently suggests
that empathy for the abuser's shame (or embarrassment at having caused it)
stands in the way of achieving full consciousness of oneself as a victim." 9
The difference between these two perspectives is not, or not merely, cultural
and historical-each recognizes the other as a possible, and understandable,
moral response within its own framework. Are we then to overcome pathological
anger through moral embarrassment, and pathological embarrassment through
moral anger? Is moral appropriateness a matter of mental health, or is mental
health to be achieved by means of the apparent reversibility of our moral
attitudes in such matters? Abstracting from historical contexts (and perhaps from
historical truths) there would seem to be only a hairsbreadth of difference
between the mythic stories that allow the abuser to identify with the victim and
make reconciliation possible and the mythic stories that allow the victim to
identify with the abuser and make continuing oppression likely.
The historical truth, of course, may matter here for some purposes. Not all
violence or abuse is an expression of unconscious incestuous love. The victim
may be rightly offended by the suggestion that it is, and demand "the truth" as
an antidote. In truth, there may have been no meaningful connection between the
victim and perpetrator of abuse, and no unconscious compulsion on the victim's
part to experience or repeat the psychic injury (and its attendant humiliation) as

116.
117.
118.
119.

Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity 219-20 (California, 1993).
Mohandas K. Gandhi, Hind Swarai or Indian Home Rule 72-75 (Navajivan, 1938).
Id at 81.
See, for example, Bass and Davis, The Courage to Heal 58-59 (cited in note 67).
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a way of maintaining their "wounded attachment" to the injurer. 2 '
Often, however, the history of abuse also means that the injury itself
establishes a relationship of sorts, and that the process of healing creates an
attachment. As victims integrate their injured status into their future lives, the
unconscious fantasy of incestuous love and the mechanisms by which that
fantasy is unconsciously repressed continue to be available in one or another
form. In this respect all abusive relationships are implicitly erotic, and to this
extent they are also unconsciously incestuous before or after the fact. But this
only means that the search for reconciliation through recognition of the incestuous bond between the victim and perpetrator may involve denial (or even
repression) of the historical injury, and that the desire to relive and remember the
historical abuse may involve denial (or even repression) of the bond. In other
words-whomever we can love, we also can hate. 2' There is thus a frequent
tension in therapy, and in therapeutic politics, between reconciliation and
liberation, between healing and breaking free."
The foregoing discussion makes clear that the processes of identification

120. See Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity ch 3
(Princeton, 1995).
121. See Jerome Neu, Odi et Amo: On Hating the Ones We Love in John O'Neill, ed,
Freud and the Passions (Pennsylvania State, 1996) (forthcoming).
122. This tension is reflected in the recent debate between Freudians and anti-Freudians
over what weight to give to unconscious fantasy and repressed memory in accounts of
childhood experiences of incest by adults undergoing therapy. The moral fervor of the
debate seems to rest upon a degree of confusion by both sides about what follows from
each position. For their part, Freud's critics seem to assume that describing incest as a
memory makes it unforgivable-and that expressing appropriate anger allows the former
victim to become a survivor and break free. Freud's defenders sometimes seem to assume
that, whatever actually happened, the patient must still come to terms with her own
unconscious ambivalence in order to be healed, and that the truth about what actually
happened is relevant mainly for legal, rather than therapeutic, purposes. See Gerald N.
Izenberg, 'Seduced and Abandoned: The Rise and Fall of Freud's Seduction Theory, in
Jerome Neu, ed, The Cambridge Companion to Freud 25 (Cambridge, 1991); Jeffrey
Moussaieff Masson, The Assault on Truth: Freud's Suppression of the Seduction Theory
(Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984); Paul Robinson, Freud and His Critics (California,
1993); Frederick Crews, The Memory Wars: Freud's Legacy in Dispute (New York
Review, 1995).
Does the truth really matter if the patient's overall goal is to achieve reconciliation?
Anti-Freudians (such as Masson) are outraged by the possibility that Freud developed his
theory to cover up the truth. At least implicitly, they challenge Freudians to explain just
what is wrong with the actual occurrence of incest, once we assume that incestuous
fantasies are at stake in the analysis of all erotic relationships and their pathologies. (To
simply answer that real incest is a "betrayal of trust" by the adult would be to beg the
question of why it is damaging to begin with.) A Freudian might respond, however, that
actual occurrences of incest tend to be developmentally harmful because the existing
capacity of the child for unconscious erotic identification with respect to infantile aims has
been manipulated and damaged by a parent-figure whose desires are all too conscious.
There are also non-psychoanalytic reasons why incest may be harmful. See Jerome Neu,
What's Wrong With Incest?, 19 Inquiry 27 (1976).
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(both conscious and unconscious) are no less part of the logic of victim and
perpetrator than of the logic of forgiveness and reconciliation. Freudians know
that sadistic violence would be mere exertion were it not for the unconscious
identification of the sadist with the pain and humiliation he inflicts. 123 The
unconscious ambivalence (between love and hate, pain and pleasure, destruction
and survival) that underlies most abuse is what allows for the mutuality and
forgiveness in which moral reformers like Gandhi and Lincoln have placed their
trust. But this same ambivalence allows continuing abuse to be rationalized by
ideologies of patriarchal, or even divine, love.
We must remember in this regard that slavery's apologists have always used
the mutual identification and dependence that was (at least arguably) present
between master and slave to expand upon the positive features of the Southern
way of life. 24 Such nostalgic claims provoke understandable anger on the part
of those who claim to speak for the victims of slavery. They insist upon the truth
of lived experience as a necessary answer to the ideologies through which victims
are expected to identify with their abusers. 2
B. FORGIVING AND FORGETTING

The potential conflict between reconciliation and truth in the construction of
a post-traumatic political identity is the source of a further ambiguity in Lincoln's national survivor story. His story is, at the very least, a form of amnesty 126-an effort to take the nation past the divisive traumas of slavery and
civil war. In the aftermath of civil war or revolution, amnesty is always an
2
appealing alternative to purges, political prosecutions, and lustration laws. 2

123. This is, of course, an oversimplification of Freud's view of sadism as a redirection
of primary masochism. See Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination ch 2 (Pantheon, 1988). See also Sigmund Freud,
General Psychological Theory: Papers on Metapsychology chs 4, 8, 11 (Collier, 1963).
124. For discussions of the psychic and political economy of slavery see Eugene D.
Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery: Studies in the Economy and Society of the
Slave South (Wesleyan, 2d ed 1989); Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World
the Slaves Made (Pantheon, 1974). For a reconsideration of the moral legacy of apologists
for slavery see Eugene D. Genovese, The Southern Tradition: The Achievements and
Limitations of an American Conservatism (Harvard, 1994).
125. For a further development of this idea see Binder, Cardozo L Rev (cited in note

98) (forthcoming).
126. On post-Civil War amnesties see Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty at 29-38 (cited in
note 112) and Charles Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion 1864-88, in Paul A. Freund,
ed, 6-7 The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise: History of the Supreme Court of the United
States 94-96, 783 (Macmillan, 1971).
127. See, for example, George Weigel, Their Lustration-and Ours, 94 Commentary 34
(Oct 1992); Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs Accountability in Bosnia, 88 Am J Intl L 500

(1994); Jeri Laber, Witch Hunt in Prague, 39 NY Rev Books 5 (Apr 23, 1992); Note,
Problems with Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty under the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El

Salvador 43 Stan L Rev 733 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to
Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 Yale L J 2537, 2595-606
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But amnesties are generally based on both a desire to forget and a need to
remember.
Recent amnesties have taken two distinct approaches to the relationship
between forgiveness and the acknowledgment of truth. In the first approach,
amnesty is offered as a political compromise. This is the kind of amnesty that
Rafil Alfonsin eventually offered to Argentina's generals out of a fear that they
would otherwise return.' Throughout Latin America, such broad-based amnesties were eventually viewed as preconditions to the restoration of democracy.
Thereafter, national truth commissions were established in order to settle
accounts with the past as far as possible, and perhaps to create an authoritative
story of national survival for the future.' 29
In the second approach, amnesty is offered only as a consequence of political
cleansing. This has been Nelson Mandela's public view of amnesty. You will be
forgiven, he promises, for any political crimes you confess, and prosecuted for
those you conceal. 3 Unlike truth commissions elsewhere, the South African

(1991).
128. See David Pion-Berlin, Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and
Government Policy in Democratic Argentina, 23 J .at Am Stud 543, 560-65 (1991); Juan
Mendez, Truth and PartialJustice in Argentina: An Update: An Americas Watch Report
(Human Rights Watch, 1991); Elizabeth Jelin, The Politics of Memory: The Human Rights
Movement and the Construction of Democracy in Argentina, 21 Lat Am Persp 38, 47
(Spring 1994); Carlos S. Nino, The Duty to Punish Past Abuses of Human Rights Put
Into Context. The Case of Argentina, 100 Yale L J 2619, 2622-30 (1991); Rita Arditti
and M. Brinton Lykes, "Recovering Identity": The Work of the Grandmothers of Plaza
de Mayo, 15 Women's Stud Intl F 461, 466-67 (1992).
129. For a defense of this view, see Jos6 Zalaquett, Balancing Ethical Imperatives and
Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights
Violations, 43 Hastings L J 1425, 1437 (1992). Zalaquett points out that some trials were
allowed as exceptions to the amnesties, and that in Uruguay the amnesty itself was almost
repealed in a popular vote. Id at 1432. For discussions of truth commissions see Priscilla
B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 Human
R Q 597 (1994); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Whole Truth and Nothing But the Truth: Truth
Commissions, Impunity and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 12 BU Intl L J 321
(1994). For a discussion of the politics of reconciliation in Brazil and Uruguay see Lawrence Weschler, A Miracle, A Universe: Settling Accounts With the Torturers (Pantheon,
1990). For the Chilean experience see Report of the Chilean National Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation (Notre Dame, 1993). For general discussions of relevant issues
see Alice Henlin, ed, State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon (Aspen Institute, 1989).
130. On May 17, 1995, the South African Parliament established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission with the authority to document past crimes, award reparations, and
grant amnesties. Viewing Apartheid Abuses, NY Times A10 (May 18, 1995). President
Mandela signed the legislation in July. Suzanne Daley, Panel to Investigate Atrocities of
the Apartheid Era, NY Times A3 (Aug 27, 1995). For a brief discussion of the disagreements over the scope and effects of the earlier South African amnesty measures
enacted between 1990 and 1994 see South Africa Confronts its Past, 331 Economist 39
(June 11, 1994). For a brief discussion of former President F.W. de Klerk's Further
Indemnity Act see Christopher Merrett, Amnesia by Decree, 22 Index on Censorship 21-22
(1993). For fuller accounts of the issues dividing Mandela on the scope of amnesty see
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Truth and Reconciliation Commission has the power to grant amnesties in return
for disclosure, and to threaten the prosecution of persons who are found to have
committed acts they did not disclose."' Although it is too early to tell how this
will work out, Mandela's view holds forth the possibility that forgiving does not
require forgetting, and that the search for truth will bring a measure of historical
justice.
Although the Lincoln we remember is generally credited with the sort of
moral vision that we now ascribe to Mandela, Lincoln, the President, faced a
very different task in linking amnesty to a military and political strategy for
winning an ongoing Civil War. His wartime amnesty policy was partly based on
the urgency of restoring loyalist governments in federally-occupied Louisiana and
Arkansas, and of finding enough collaborators to avoid large-scale disorder in
the rest of the occupied South. The specific features of this policy changed over
time with military and political exigencies, and at war's end he may even have
condoned General Sherman's policy of working through existing rebel governments-a policy embodied in the Sherman-Johnston peace convention signed
three days after Lincoln's death.'32
There was, nevertheless, a principled basis for Lincoln's view of amnesty.
Throughout the war, Lincoln disagreed with those in his own party who believed
that at the moment of secession the Southern state governments ceased to exist
(and that defeated Confederate states could henceforth be administered by
Congress as federal territories). His position was, rather, that secession had been
illegal because the union was indestructible. It followed that the states in rebellion continued to exist as members of the Union, but that individuals, especially
political leaders, were engaged in illegal acts of rebellion. The task of reconstruction therefore required granting a sufficient number of individual amnesties so
that the states (which had always consisted of their loyal citizens) could resume
self-government. 133
Based on this constitutional theory, Lincoln issued his Proclamation of
Amnesty and Reconstruction of December 1863.' It granted a full pardon to
ordinary citizens and soldiers participating in the rebellion on condition that they
sign an oath of loyalty to the United States, and that they agree to abide by all
wartime acts of Congress and presidential proclamations on the subject of

Alex Boraine, et al, eds, Dealing with the Past: Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa
(Institute for Democracy in South Africa, 1994).
131. Daley, NY Times at A3 (cited in note 130).

132. Lincoln's wartime policy was that a number of citizens equal to at least 10% of
the 1860 electorate must be granted amnesty for self-government to be restored. Belz,
Reconstructing the Union at 157 (cited in note 69). The evolution of Lincoln's wartime
policy is summarized in id at 291-304, and Lincoln's probable attitude toward the
Sherman-Johnston peace convention is discussed in id at 278-79.
133. See Belz, Reconstructing the Union at 154-166 (cited in note 69); Hesseltine,
Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction at 70-71 (cited in note 69).
134. Lincoln, Proclamation of Amnesty and Reconstruction of Dec 8, 1863, 13 Stat 737

(1863-65).
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slavery.' s Ineligible for the pardon were officials of the "so-called Confederate
Government," high-ranking Confederate military and naval officers, persons who
resigned their seats in Congress or their military and naval commissions to join
the rebellion in violation of their oaths of office, persons who resigned their
judicial positions to help the rebellion, and all persons who mistreated prisoners
of war.'36 These individuals were not entitled to an automatic pardon upon
taking a voluntary oath, and could not have their rights restored without further
action by the President or Congress.1 7 The possibility of trials and/or amnesty
for top Confederates and war criminals was thus left open by Lincoln during his
lifetime.
Such trials were a serious possibility toward the end of the war, when stories
were circulating widely in the North of atrocities in Southern prison camps in
which the leaders of the Confederacy, including Jefferson Davis, were alleged to
be personally implicated.' Andersonville prison camp in Georgia became the
leading symbol of these atrocities. Its commanding officer died, however, in
February 1865, and Captain Henry Wirz, the second in command, was the only
person tried for war crimes in the aftermath of the Civil War. His trial and
eventual execution did not, however, accomplish the intended purpose of
establishing a definitive moral truth about Andersonville. Instead, the singularity
of the prosecution, and the irregularities that occurred in the presentation of evidence, convinced some Southerners that Wirz had become a martyr of the
Confederacy.'39
The question of what do with Jefferson Davis raised other problems for
Lincoln's theory of post-war responsibility. After Davis was captured in flight
immediately following Lincoln's assassination, a serious effort was made to try
the President of the defeated Confederacy for treason in the federal court in
Virginia-which (not coincidentally) was presided over by the Chief Justice of
the United States, Salmon P. Chase. 40 The charge against Davis was motivated
partly by a desire to prove that secession (and waging war to defend it) were
themselves treasonous acts under the Constitution, and partly by the claim (never

135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty under Lincoln and Johnson at 34-36 (cited in note

112).
138. For examples see Robert H. Kellogg, Life and Death in Rebel Prisons: Giving a
Complete History of the Inhuman and Barbarous Treatment of Our Brave Soldiers by
Rebel Authorities Inflicting Terrible Suffering and Frightful Mortality, Principally at
Andersonville, GA., and Florence, S.C. (L. Stebbins, 1865).
139. The trial and its context are discussed in Ovid L. Futch, History of Andersonville
Prison 113-22 (Florida, 1968). For an account of the evidence by one of the presiding
officers at the trial, and a response to the charge, inscribed on a monument erected to
Wirz, that he was "judicially murdered," see General N.P. Chipman, The Tragedy of
Andersonville: Trial of Captain Henry Wirz, the Prison Keeper 11-18 (1911) (published by
the author).
140. Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty at 29S (cited in note 112).
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substantiated) that Davis may have been complicit in Lincoln's murder. 4'
Chase, however, had to preside over the impeachment trial of President Johnson,
42
and for this and other reasons the Davis trial was delayed.1
Before the trial took place, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and
Chase came to believe that Section Three, barring former federal officials who
served the Confederacy from again holding federal office, constituted a legal punishment that precluded any further prosecution of those to whom it applied. 4
Chase's view on this matter was never finally upheld by the Supreme Court (his
fellow-judge on the Circuit Court disagreed), but, fortified by the Chief Justice's
position, President Johnson issued a universal amnesty proclamation for all
unpardoned Confederates on Christmas Day, 1868, that effectively disposed of
the treason charge against Davis.'44
In practical effect, if not intent, the Fourteenth Amendment had become a
kind of amnesty that allowed those Confederate officials who had left U.S.
government service to be punished for violating their oath of office, and for
nothing else. 4 ' Chase's claim that Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment
is a self-executing punishment had only backward-looking implications for the
nation as a whole, and for this reason the record of prosecutions and amnesties
from 1865 through 1868 conveys no clear moral message about the Civil War's
meaning.141
The core argument of this Article suggests, however, that Lincoln's story of
national survival was itself an effort to establish a national consensus on the
meaning of the war-an "official truth" that is arguably more authoritative than
truths established by political trials, and that would serve as the foundation of
a practical program of post-war reconstruction.' 47 In the words of one commentator, "[R]econstruction was ... the basic issue of the Civil War.... In the
48
fullest sense, secession was the South's effort to avoid . . . reconstruction."
To what extent does the amnesty implied by Lincoln's story of national survival
contribute to a deeper view of the meaning of the Civil War and its aftermath

141. Id at 295.
142. Id.
143. Id at 311-12, 358.
144. It did not apply to the suspicion of conspiring to commit murder under which
Davis was first arrested. That apparently false accusation, on which he was never indicted,
reinforced Davis's lifelong refusal to seek or accept the individual clemencies that had
earlier been accorded to other Confederate leaders. See Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty at
302-05, 311-12, 358 (cited in note 112).
145. For discussions of the entire matter see Roy Franklin Nichols, United States vs
Jefferson Davis, 1865-1869, 31 Am Hist Rev 266 (1926); Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty at
135-52 (cited in note 112); Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln ch 5 (cited
in note 51).
146. For a rough sense of the number of post-war treason indictments brought see
Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln at 96-102 (cited in note 51).
147. For a forthright effort to accomplish a similar objective without political trials see
Report of the Chilean National Commission at 13-15 (cited in note 129).
148. Hesseltine, Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction at 12 (cited in note 69).
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than his own wartime policies suggested to his immediate contemporaries? Before
considering this issue at the level of constitutional theory, it is Worth illustrating
anecdotally the changing relationship between amnesty and reconstruction as the
Civil War receded in memory.
In the years immediately following the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, amnesty served as a device to block radical reconstruction, and allow the
large elements of the Confederate power structure to be restored in the defeated
South. Congress, between 1868 and 1898, restored the right to hold office of
almost all former Confederate officials by two-thirds vote, using a procedure
specifically provided for this purpose in the Fourteenth Amendment itself. 4'
The two notable exceptions were Jefferson Davis and Robert E. Lee, whose
disloyalty had special symbolic weight for Northern politicians who were willing
to restore the honor of other ex-Confederates. 5 ° Over the years Southern legislators repeatedly failed to reverse this symbolic disgrace of their two long-dead
heroes.
The claims of Lee and Davis to a full restoration of the rights of citizenship
took on new life during the debate over granting amnesty to Americans accused
of draft evasion or military desertion during the Vietnam war. Politicians
opposed to amnesty argued that amnesty was inappropriate for individuals who
had been disloyal to their country in time of war, especially if such an amnesty
were not accompanied by an obligation of national service.15 1 Evoking the
figure of Lincoln, Senators Philip Hart and Mark Hatfield advocated full and
unconditional amnesty for unpardoned Americans from both the Civil and
Vietnam wars, including Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis." 2
It remained for Jimmy Carter-a century after the first Reconstruction
ended-to articulate the now-settled meaning of the Lincolnian vision of national
recovery. In restoring full citizenship to Jefferson Davis,5 3 President Carter
called upon Americans "to clear away the guilts and enmities and recriminations
of the past, to finally set at rest the divisions that threatened to destroy our
Nation and to discredit the great principles on which it was founded." 4 This
message applied equally to the amnesty President Carter granted to those who
disagreed with their government on Vietnam: "I have a historical perspective
about this question. I come from the South. I know at the end of the War
Between the States there was a sense of forgiveness for those who had not been
loyal to our country in the past ....
Speaking as a Southerner, and as a U.S. President, Carter's words reflect the

149. Francis MacDonnell, Reconstruction in the Wake of Vietnam: The Pardoning of
Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis, 40 Civil War Hist 119, 121 (1994).
150. Id at 119-20, 133.
151. Id at 126-27.
152. Id at 126, 129-31.

153. Lee's right to hold office had already been restored by President Ford. Id at 129.
154. Id at 119, 131.
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subtlety of the Lincolnian balance between forgiving and not forgetting. We
remember, he suggests, in order not to be reminded; we forgive because we
cannot forget. This is a morally creditable position, and not (despite the obvious
logrolling on two symbolic issues) a mere political compromise. But forgiveness
is relatively easy if the only crime is alleged disloyalty, and there are no surviving
s
victims whose voices are silenced by amnesty.'
Acknowledging this, however, should once again direct our attention to the
fundamental fact that the Lincolnian survivor story is inherently a better way of
coping with the guilt of perpetrators than of doing justice to victims. 7 Even
if the survivor story unambiguously requires the perpetrator to identify with the
victim, and even if forgiveness requires full confession, the survivor story invariably relies on identification to do its work. By putting those who committed
abuse on an equal moral footing with their historical victims, these stories in
effect authorize "us" to stop listening to the voice of the victim insofar as this is
what it takes to recover from a traumatic history and to reunite. This conclusion
ought to be disturbing for critical race theorists who argue that past atrocities
can only be fully acknowledged by adopting a conception of human rights that
listens to victims' stories." 8
The foregoing discussion suggests, however, that in the politics of recovery
the main alternative to identification is a form of representation that would stress
the indelible difference between the victim and the perpetrator as the basis for a
counterhegemonic claim to power. Those who reject the moral logic of reconciliation will tend to embrace the rhetoric of liberation and self-determination that
we earlier identified as Cultural Wilsonianism. Whenever past victims claim as
much sovereignty as it takes to turn the tables, the regressive logic of reprisal and
counter-reprisal is set loose. No reader of Nietzsche can be sure that the perpetrators of past discrimination are wrong to hear "the voice of the victim" as
a threat." 9
C. SOJOURNERS As SURVIVORS: LINKS BETWEEN THE MODELS

Although our contrast between Lincoln and Wilson has revealed certain

156. For views of the Chilean dilemma see Robert J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law
End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime:
Chile's New Model, 62 Fordham L Rev 62 905 (1994); Jos6 Zalaquett, Confronting
Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles Applicable and
Political Constraints, in Alice Henkin, ed, State Crimes: Punishment or Pardon 23 (Aspen
Institute, 1989).

157. Justice to victims may, of course, come in other ways, such as the achievement of
meaningful majority rule in South Africa.
158. See Mari J. Matsuda, Public
Story, in Mari J. Matsuda, et al, eds,
Speech and the First Amendment 17
159. See Meister, 15 Topoi (cited
Injury 26-27 (cited in note 120).

Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive
(Westview, 1993).
in note 99) (forthcoming); Wendy Brown, States of
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essential features of the survivor and sojourner models, we must move beyond
the ideas of these two figures to see more clearly the relation between the models
themselves."' A dark implication of our discussions of both Lincoln and Wilson has been that survivor stories often rationalize abuses that produce new
demands for secession based on the sovereign coequality of peoples. Secessionist
movements in turn produce victims who may become survivors with new stories
of their own.
The troubling truth is that many civil wars throughout the world are based
on such a cycle, and that many nations that see themselves as Lincolnian survivors are doomed to fight civil wars against Wilsonian claims. This cycle is not
universal, but it is observable, and suggests that the two distinct logics of
equalization described above may be both interdependent and mutually subversive at a deeper level.' By this I mean that each story has an observable tendency to undermine its own premises and to motivate acceptance of the other.
A more limited claim is that certain transnational aspects of modern nationalism are illuminated by the connection between our two models. The first aspect
is that exiles and refugees are sojourners with the consciousness of survivors. The
second is that many re-established national states are the products of transnational efforts by exiles and refugees who survived as individuals, recovered, and
carried their stories with them. 2 The third aspect is that newer nations such
as the United States, Canada, South Africa, and some Latin American republics
have forged multicultural identities based on stories of resettlement by survivors
of Old World persecution. 63 These settler-states have been periodically open to

160. Not surprisingly, the Bible is the source of both models. In the Old Testament, the
Children of Israel are sojourners who forge a new identity as survivors under the
leadership of Moses. Having lived in bondage in a strange land, they make the transition
from cult to nation to covenantal state where their survival becomes the basis of another
story. This transformation has the character of both a journey and a return. The survivorship and national renewal of the Jews enables them to conquer the indigenous Canaanites
who must live like sojourners in the land of their birth. Compare Michael Walzer, Exodus
and Revolution (Basic Books, 1985), and Edward Said, Michael Walzer's "Exodus and
Revolution": A CanaaniteReading, 8 Arab Stud 289, 293-94 (1986). The book of Exodus
is not, however, our only canonical text of survivorship. The Aeneid, for example, is an
effort to portray the founding of Rome as a survivor story.
161. See Meister, 15 Topoi (cited in note 99) (forthcoming).
162. For an illuminating comparison of the Jewish and Black "diasporas" see Paul
Gilroy, Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness 205-12 (Harvard, 1993). See
also Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism (Verso, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds, The Invention of
Tradition (Cambridge, 1992).
163. Refugees are different from ordinary sojourners or ordinary immigrants. By their
own movements they manage to avoid some of the burden of guilt that comes when
victims identify with persecutors in order to survive in the same place. As refugees, their
claim is not necessarily to be sovereign somewhere, or to return to their "homeland,"
although some may be fortunate enough to have such options.
As suggested above, refugees are most likely to gain haven when significant elements
of the local majority can identify with them and participate in the creation of a new myth

158

Roundtable

[3:121

the claim of new minorities, seeking adoption rather than self-government, despite (or perhaps, because of) the traditional resistance of newly founded nations
to the primordial claims of indigenous peoples. 1"
For admirers of the Lincolnian tradition, however, it is a troubling fact that
survivor stories are routinely invoked to legitimate the sovereignty of settler
colonial states over now-dependent native communities on the basis of higher,
transnational concerns with the human rights of refugees. In Lincoln's vision of
America, for example, it was not essential for indigenous peoples to survive. He
assumed that we, as their successors, were to survive them rather than identify
with their experience of survival. Since Lincoln, we have become a single nation
based on the equality of newcomers and natives, and on the denial of the general
proposition that indigenousness confers a special right to self-determination. This
paradigm shift was a serious blow to our own indigenous peoples who fared
particularly badly under Lincoln and his Republican successors, such as
Grant.16 s Even today, the rights of dependent sovereign peoples-as distinct
from groups-remain an anomaly under the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment,
166
as we shall see below.
As a general matter, we cannot conclude our presentation of the sojourner
and survivor models with the hope that clarity and progress are to be achieved
by choosing between them. We can merely say that the two logics did in fact
emerge at distinct periods in American history, and that at critical moments they
have appeared as clear alternatives to each other. For this reason some of the
binary choices that have marked our national politics-liberty or union, sovereignty or equality-reflect the difference between experiencing our formative
national traumas as either a recovering survivor or a potential victim.
Ultimately, however, the distinction between the two models is grounded in
the choice between reconciliation and self-assertion as moral styles, and between
unification and liberation as political strategies. To see this, however, is to
recognize that our two models are more than responses to different moments in
our own national history-the moment of national liberation from colonial
power and the moment of civil war. They are also logically and historically
linked in ways that may illuminate, more broadly, the complex relationships

of common survival. Of course not all local majorities are willing to accept the new
identity implied by the adoption of refugees for whom they were not responsible (consider
the Palestinian example). And not all countries willing to accept refugees possess pre-existing survivor stories-Sweden, for example, does not.
164. See Louis Hartz, et al, The Founding of New Societies: Studies in the History of
the United States, Latin America, South Africa, Canada, and Australia 3-23 (Harcourt,
Brace, 1964).
165. For a popular account see Robert M. Utley and William E. Washburn, The American Heritage History of The Indian Wars (American Heritage, 1977). The role of the Civil
War Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and Hancock in the waging of "total war" against
native Americans is specifically discussed in id at 290-93, 255-56, 241-44.
166. For a general discussion of these issues outside the North American context see
Richard Mulgan, Should Indigenous Peoples Have Special Rights?, 33 Orbis 375 (1989).
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between independence struggles and civil wars in various political regimes.
We shall next explore this linkage as a formative element in American
constitutional development. What happens when the distinctive Lincolnian logic
of civil war and survivorship becomes intertwined with the Marshallian constitutional logic that gave meaning to our national independence? Does our
experience of living with the two logics of constitutional development described
thus far contain any lessons for the world?
III. The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction
Recent world events suggest that Americans should stop celebrating the
global triumph of the ideals of our Revolution and begin to ponder the constitutional lessons of our Civil War and Reconstruction. Section I of this essay will
demonstrate how the logic of sojourners and the logic of survivors are the
sources of two distinct, but mutually parasitical, interpretations of the Fourteenth
Amendment, based on two different conceptions of the Reconstruction that
occurred after the Civil War.
In the discussion that follows, we shall first consider how the Fourteenth
Amendment was originally interpreted by the Court as a development of
Marshallian constitutionalism, and how this way of thinking was both expanded
6 7
and preserved in Brown v Board of Education"
and its progeny. We shall

then consider what a Lincolnian version of Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence
would be, and demonstrate how Brown and its progeny embrace that second
paradigm witfiout thereby superseding the first. Finally, we shall illustrate the
interaction and conflict of our two paradigms by considering some problems
arising from the incorporation of the First Amendment under the Fourteenth
Amendment. How do the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, arising in a
project of national reconstruction, affect the possibility that government can be
truly neutral with respect to certain issues of religion and speech under the First
Amendment?
A. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND MARSHALLIAN RECONSTRUCTION
The first account of Reconstruction is an expansion of the paradigm of
interstate sojourners that lies at the foundation of Marshallian federalism. Under
this account, the judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment has
functioned in effect as a negative template of the jurisprudence of Dred
Scott 68-- reversing its holding while preserving its structure.
To grasp this point we must recognize that Dred Scott did not foreshadow
the arguments based on states' rights that Southerners made to defend segregation a century later.'69 Rather, Taney's reasoning was understood (and even

167. 347 US 483 (1954).
168. 60 US 393 (1856).
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welcomed by writers such as Hurd) as an expansion of the federal power to
equalize among states-a power that might eventually have been used to subject
all state laws conferring rights on Negroes to a strict standard of federal judicial
review of their adverse impact on the sovereign power of some states to preserve
the institution of slavery. 7' For Americans who anticipated a future based on
Dred Scott (and not the Fourteenth Amendment), the constitutional commitment
to the equality of slave and free states would no longer be protected only by the
veto power of the Senate over future legislative efforts to abolish slavery. The
Court's opinion in Dred Scott meant that the laws of free states and federal
territories could henceforth have been subject to federal judicial review on the
issue of whether they discriminated against an interstate diaspora of
slaveholders.' 7'
Such judicial review would have focused not merely on the use of invidious
classifications that banned slavery, but also on the intent of facially benign
classifications (was their purpose to exclude slavery?) and the impact of those
classifications (was this their effect?).' 72 Clearly, an affirmative constitutional
commitment to extend equal federal citizenship to the holders of slave property
would require the federal courts to deny similar protection to the privileges or
immunities that local majorities in some free states extended to resident Negroes
through their liberty laws." 3 These state-created claims of resident Negroes
would then be viewed by federal courts as mere beneficial interests that must
give way to the constitutionally protected rights of out-of-state slaveholders.'74
This horrifying vision of a future under Dred Scott was not confined to
academic writers such as Hurd. In 1860, the U.S. Congress passed legislation
introduced by Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis that would have implemented
Dred Scott's promise of nondiscrimination against out-of-state slaveholders in
much the way that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 implements the Warren Court's
promise of nondiscrimination against the descendants of slaves. 's This view of
Dred Scott's implications was partly shared by Lincoln who predicted in his
debates with Douglas that "the next Dred Scott decision" would explicitly allow
slaveholders to claim some of the benefits of Southern law while in the North
when the Taney Court overturned a New York decision to the contrary.'76

Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860, 54 J Ill St Hist Soc 117, 167-72 (1961). For a
general discussion of how the theory of state sovereignty evoked by Southern states before
the Civil War differed from later doctrines of states' rights see Arthur Bestor, The Civil
War as a Constitutional Crisis, 69 Am Hist Rev 327 (1964).
170. For a discussion of this and other issues surrounding Dred Scott, see Meister, 3
Stud Am Pol Dev 199 (cited in note 14).
171. Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol Dev at 199-200, 211 (cited in note 14).
172. See id at 255-56.
173. Id at 243, 247.
174. Id at 244-45.
175. Id at 248, 255-56.
176. Here Lincoln merely expressed the view of many antislavery Northerners who
feared that Dred Scott would lead to further judicial decisions nationalizing the en-
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Although the Fourteenth Amendment was originally drafted by politicians
who sought to advance the rights of newly freed Negroes in the former Confederate states, it was eventually interpreted by judges immersed in the logical
framework that had produced Dred Scott." These judges were to be the final
authority on the constitutional meaning of the Civil War for the Marshallian
framework of federalism.
The Supreme Court was forced to address this issue in the Slaughter-House

Cases,'T where it interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time. The
cases arose because a new populist majority in Louisiana, reflecting carpetbagger
influence, decided to create a legislatively-chartered and regulated monopoly on
slaughterhouses. Similar legislation had been regarded by pre-Civil War courts as
a legitimate exercise of the police power,79 but the Fourteenth Amendment
raised new grounds for challenging this type of state action. In the SlaughterHouse Cases, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the legislative ban
on selling meat that had been slaughtered outside the publicly regulated scheme
was a violation by the state of the privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens in
regard to private property.
In this first case pitting individual rights against federalism after the Civil
War, the Supreme Court ruled that the "privileges or immunities" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not add any substantive rights to those protected
under the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article IV. 8 Writing for the
majority, Justice Miller argued that the new constitutional protection for "the
privileges or immunities" of U.S. citizenship simply reiterated the previous ban
on discrimination by states in the context of the new national citizenship, while

forcement of slavery. For a convincing argument that these fears were plausible see,
Finkelman, An Imperfect Union at 313-338 (cited in note 14). One case that raised such
fears was Lemmon v The People. See id at 296-312. See also Paul Finkelman, ed, 3
Southern Slaves in Free State Courts: The Pamphlet Literature 549-694 (Garland, 1988)
(case reprint with contemporaneous commentary).
177. Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol Dev at 248-50 (cited in note 14).
178. 83 US (16 Wall) 36 (1872).
179. The exception was Wynehamer v The People, 13 NY 378 (1856), in which a state
prohibition law was struck down as an abridgement of the constitutionally protected
property rights of distillery owners without due process of law. Wynehamer was decided
while Dred Scott was being reargued, and may have influenced Taney to refer to the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment in striking down the Missouri Compromise as a
violation of individual property rights (as well as the sovereignty of the state that had
established them). See Dred Scott 60 US at 450. Hurd gives explicit consideration to, and
rejects, the analogy between Wynehamer and Dred Scott in 1 The Law of Freedom and
Bondage at 565 n 1 (cited in note 32). For further discussions of Wynehamer and Dred
Scott as precursors of the doctrine of substantive due process, see Edward Corwin, The
Dred Scott Decision in the Light of Contemporary Legal Doctrines, in Richard Loss, ed,
2 Corwin on the Constitution 299, 309-310 (Cornell, 1987), and Edward Corwin, The
Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, in Loss, ed, 2 Corwin on the
Constitution at 149, 170-73.
180. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US at 74-76.
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leaving open the possibility that Congress might legislate additional new rights
for national citizens as a matter of positive law.' In the absence of Congressional action, the Fourteenth Amendment would give a U.S. citizen a federally
protected right to the non-abridgement of only those civil rights that a state
already provided its own citizens.'82
In his dissenting opinion in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice Bradley
wished to move beyond the antebellum limitations on the range of substantive
individual rights that could receive constitutional protection. He therefore argued
that in opening the way for an amended Constitution, the Civil War had united
the nation as never before, thus allowing the federal courts to enforce a set of
common national rights, whether or not these had been declared by Congress.' 83
Justice Bradley achieved a synthesis of the two opposing positions in the
Slaughter-House Cases when he wrote for the Court in the so-called Civil Rights
Cases.184 This synthesis allowed him to reconcile the expanded judicial protection of individual rights made possible by the Fourteenth Amendment with the
Marshallian framework of analysis based on federalism.18
The Civil Rights Cases involved a constitutional test of the very type of
legislation that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to legitimate-the Civil Rights Act of 1875186 which effectively strengthened the Civil
Rights Act of 1866187 with respect to common carriers. In the Civil Rights
Cases, however, Justice Bradley struck down portions of the Civil Rights Acts as
themselves unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Claiming that the
enforcement authority of the Fourteenth Amendment covered only questions of
public law (state versus individual) and not questions of private law (individual
versus individual), he argued that the relevant portions of the Civil Rights Acts
were an unconstitutional intrusion on the sovereign powers of the states to
govern the private relations among state citizens.188 Bradley's reasoning implicitly followed the Slaughter-House Cases (and Dred Scott) in viewing state sovereignty as the source of all constitutionally protected individual rights.
To post-Civil War jurists, such as Bradley, the real issue between Taney and

181. Id at 77.

182. Id at 74-79. The discussion in this section is adapted from Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol
Dev at 249-51 (cited in note 14). For more recent treatments see Harrison, 101 Yale L
J 1385 (cited in note 18) and William E. Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment: From Political Principle to Judicial Doctrine 155-74 (Harvard, 1988).
183. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US at 123-24 (Bradley dissenting).
184. 109 US 3 (1883).
185. My interpretation of the relationship between these two cases is indebted to
Duncan Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Classical Legal Thought, 1850-1940 (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
186. Act to Protect all Citizens in their Civil and Legal Rights, 18 Stat 335 (1875).

187. Act to Protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, 14 Stat 27
(1866).
188. Civil Rights Cases, 109 US at 3, 11, 13, 25.

19961

Sojourners and Survivors 163

Curtis, the principal dissenter in Dred Scott, was whether free blacks would have
to be denied U.S. citizenship in order to be discriminated against on the basis of
race. Curtis had argued, with no apparent irony, that legal discrimination against
free blacks who were U.S. citizens would be no less problematic than legal
discrimination against women and children:
[N]umerous persons, though citizens, cannot vote, or cannot hold office,
either on account of their age, or sex, or the want of the necessary legal
qualifications. The truth is, that citizenship, under the Constitution of the
United States, is not dependent on the possession of any particular political
or even of all civil rights. .

.

. What civil rights shall be enjoyed by its

citizens, and whether all shall enjoy the same are to be determined [by each
state].
One may confine the right of suffrage to white male citizens; another
may extend it to colored persons and females; one may allow all persons
above a prescribed age to coivey property and transact business; another
may exclude married women. But whether native-born women, or persons
under age, or under guardianship because insane or spendthrifts, be excluded from voting or holding office, or allowed to do so, I apprehend no one
will deny that they are citizens of the United States.' 9
The following passage from Bradley's opinion in The Civil Rights Cases is a
succinct, albeit unacknowledged, postwar restatement of Curtis's view of Negro
citizenship in Dred Scott:
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before the
abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty and
property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time, thought that
it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because he was not
admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because he was
subjected to discriminations in the enjoyment of accommodations in inns,
public conveyances, and places of amusement. Mere discriminations on
account of race or color were not regarded as badges of slavery.9 0
By detaching the question of equal political rights from an exclusionary

189. Dred Scott, 60 US at 583 (Curtis dissenting). Justice McLean made a similar

observation in the same case:
It has never been held necessary, to constitute a citizen within the act, that he
should have the qualifications of an elector. Females and minors may sue in the
Federal courts, and so may any individual who has a permanent domicile in the
state under whose laws his rights are protected.
Id at 531 (McLean dissenting).
190. 109 US at 25 (emphasis added). See Curtis's opinion in Dred Scott:
[That the Constitution] was made exclusively for the white race is, in my opinion,
not only an assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution, but contradicted by its opening declaration, that it was ordained and established by the people
of the United States, for themselves and their posterity.
60 US at 582 (Curtis dissenting).
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conception of national citizenship, Bradley's judicial paradigm for interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly treats it as an effort to make Curtis's Dred
Scott dissent the law.19' In this view, a republic of unequal citizens would
naturally accord differing political rights to citizens of different social status.'92
States therefore retained the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to exclude
certain categories of U.S. citizens-such as blacks, women, and children-from
the right to vote and hold office. Nondiscrimination in this area would require
an affirmative political choice to counteract a pre-existing social inequality. The
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution
implicitly reflect the view that the Fourteenth Amendment permits unequal
political rights for U.S. citizens. Indeed, these later Amendments are in effect
affirmative determinations of whether, and to what degree, the right to vote shall
be denied or abridged on the basis of race, sex, and age.
Within this framework of judicial interpretation, the Fourteenth Amendment
provided limited, but real, benefits to freed slaves in the area of civil rights. First,
it "overturn[ed] the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born within the
93
United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States."1
Second, it gave constitutional legitimacy to those portions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 (potentially challengeable under Dred Scott) that struck down the
specific provisions of the Black Codes. 94 These Codes-enacted in 1865 by
almost all of the ex-Confederate states under the guise of granting civil rights to
newly freed slaves' 9 --specifically denied to Negroes the freedom of contract,

191. The Fourteenth Amendment made birth or naturalization the sole bases of U.S. citizenship, replacing the premise underlying Dred Scott that federal citizenship was a benefit
conferred mainly through citizenship in a state, and that the power of Congress to confer
citizenship was limited to foreign citizens and indigenous tribes. Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, a state was required to extend citizenship on an equal basis to all persons
born or naturalized in the United States who resided within its borders. Having established
birth or naturalization as the basis of federal citizenship, and residency as the only
legitimate criterion of state citizenship, the Fourteenth Amendment went on to forbid the
states from discriminating against their internal minorities based on identities and interests
that were largely unspecified in the text.
192. "[N]ineteenth-century usage concerning political participation confirms the close
connection between privileges and immunities and civil rights: neither was thought to
extend to political rights, such as voting or serving on juries. Political rights were commonly distinguished from civil rights, and only a subset of the citizens had the right to
participate politically. . . .Most Republicans agreed that neither civil rights nor privileges
and immunities included political rights, and legal usage generally appears to have reflected
this approach." Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1417 (cited in note 18).
193. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 US at 73.
194. Civil Rights Cases, 109 US at 22. ("Congress, as we have seen, by the Civil Rights
Bill of 1866 . . . undertook to wipe out these burdens and disabilities, the necessary
incidents of slavery . .. 1.
195. The exception was Texas, which delayed enactment. Fairman, Reconstruction and
Reunion at 117 (cited in note 126). In several states, the effect of the Black Codes would
have been to apply harsh vagrancy laws to those Negroes whose conditions of labor no
longer resembled those of slavery. See, for example, id at 114.
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property rights, judicial protection, and ordinary rights of mobility afforded
under state law to free laborers who were white." 6 A recent commentator observes:
In the terminology of Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment, a
law abridged a state law right when it took that right away from only one
group of persons. Black Codes served as the quintessential example of an
abridgment of state law rights.... The privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States include the very rights deriving from state law that
were restricted by Black Codes. Thus, an amendment that forbade the
states from abridging privileges or immunities would ban caste legislation
rights and place the principle of the Civil Rights
with respect to citizens' 197
Act in the Constitution.

This meant that, henceforth, states were to give the same civil rights (privileges
or immunities) to all U.S. citizens that states had been previously required to give
under the "privileges and immunities" clause of Article IV of the Constitution to
U.S. citizens visiting from other states.
Viewed from a pre-Civil War perspective, the significance of this paradigm
change was that every American was now in some respects to be treated as out
of state-even while at home. Under this view of Reconstruction, the Fourteenth
Amendment means that a right to nondiscrimination would no longer be directly
linked to a collective right to self-determination elsewhere. 9 ' Rather, we take
U.S. citizenship-not state citizenship-to be the foundation of a democratic
right to be treated as well as the local majority treats itself in purely civil
matters. It took nearly a century for the federal courts to reverse the decisions
that excluded many voting rights issues and most questions of private discrimination from the scope of federal constitutional protection.'99
This was largely the work of the Warren Court, which addressed these
matters only after its dramatic reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in
Brown v Board of Education."' In an earlier essay (written before I grasped
the constitutional significance of Lincoln's story of national survival) I argued
that the Warren Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in Brown
implicitly followed the logic of Dred Scott, even while reversing its moral content.20' Both decisions view constitutional rights as intrinsically concerned with
the problem of equalization among the primordial constituent groups that make
up this nation."' In Brown, however, the Warren Court greatly expanded the

196. See Fairman, Reconstruction and Reunion at 110-17 (cited in note 126).
197. Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1388-89 (cited in note 18).
198. For fuller discussion of this point see Robert Meister, Political Identity: Thinking
Through Marx 119-22, 151-220 (Blackwell, 1991).
199. These matters lie outside the scope of this paper.
200. 347 US 483 (1954).
201. Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol Dev 199 (cited in note 14).
202. See id at 255-60.
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Marshallian paradigm of constitutional protection to allow individuals to assert
new bases of constitutional identity under the Equal Protection Clause that
would trigger the kind of federal constitutional protection accorded only to outof-state U.S. citizens before the Civil War.2 3 Through its interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Warren Court
steadily expanded the range of primordial identities that could be protected
under the Marshallian model of non-discrimination far beyond the "sovereign
2°4
peoples" who made up the original federal system.
Even so, however, the logic of protecting sojourners, on which the
Marshallian model is based, implicitly requires a parallel expansion of the range
of legislatively created beneficial expectations that do not trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny. Examples abound. We cannot equalize in favor of minority
religion without privileging religious over nonreligious needs."' We cannot
equalize between male and female workers without discriminating between
employed females and homemakers.2 6 We cannot protect women and minorities from verbal abuse at work without discriminating against white male
speakers on the basis of the content of their speech. 0 The logic of this model
of antidiscrimination is always to make one basis of inequality inevitable by
denying the legitimacy of another.2 0 Viewed from the perspective of hindsight,
the logical insight behind Dred Scott was simply that we cannot equalize among
the citizens of slave and free states without discriminating against blacks on the
basis of race. It was only the first of many decisions with a similar constitutional
logic.
In the first version of our post-Civil War constitutional history, the principal
effect of the Fourteenth Amendment that culminated in the Warren era was to
transform the limited Marshallian techniques for protecting out-of-state citizens
into a paradigm for all constitutional rights to political and social equality.2 9
This is why the developing right to nondiscriminatory treatment under the
Fourteenth Amendment bears traces of the logic of separate peoplehood from
which it originated. The conclusion of the story is that some Americans can now
claim the right to nondiscrimination through identities based on race, religion,
gender, age, disability, and national origin that do not necessarily correspond to
the range of "peoples" that could plausibly assert alternative claims to sovereign
statehood under Marshall's unreconstructed Constitution. Nondiscrimination law

203. See id.
204. See id.
205. See, for example, Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398 (1963).
206. See, for example, Califano v Webster, 430 US 313 (1977).
207. See, for example, Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57 (1986).
208. See Robert Meister, Discrimination Law Through the Looking Glass, 4 Wis L Rev
937 (1985).
209. See Meister, 3 Stud Am Pol Dev at 250 (cited in note 14); Harrison, 101 Yale L
J at 1410-13 (cited in note 18); Nelson, The Fourteenth Amendment 150-55 (cited in note
182).
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within the United States is no longer linked to claims to sovereignty, but the
structural analogy with claims to sovereignty is still preserved. In a sense, the
claim to sovereignty has become a metaphor for constitutional equality rather
than the basis of it.
This version of the expansion of rights that can be claimed under the
Fourteenth Amendment (and statutes implementing it)21 suggests that for every
newly protected constitutional right ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. We begin,
that is, by imagining ingathered "nations" of the elderly, the disabled, women,
blacks, and so forth able to make laws suitable to themselves, and under which
their present legally created handicaps would be fully offset by legal advantages.
This is the mythical moment of "separate but equal." Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment kicks in when federal courts recognize the diasporic nature
of all such groups in order to enforce their rights not to be "handicapped" by
laws as they presently exist. Under this paradigm of Reconstruction, individual
rights appear as traces of the equality of sovereign and distinct peoples, some of
whom, through brutality or historical accident, have imposed their concepts of
normality on others. This view is a sublimated form of the Cultural
Wilsonianism discussed above."'
B. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND LINCOLNIAN RECONSTRUCTION
The efforts of the Warren and Burger Courts to extend the model of constitutional protection for out-of-state sojourners to groups such as women and the
elderly have placed increasingly severe strains on the framework of Marshallian
jurisprudence." 2 Many of these strains reflect the fact that the moral logic of
survivor stories constitutes a second version of Reconstruction in our Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence that we may call Lincolnian.
According to this logic, slavery has become a metaphor for other claims to
rights based on past stigmatization, exploitation, or abuse. Such an approach
goes a long way toward explaining the inclusion of women, the handicapped, the
elderly and other groups that are not nations in the moral logic of national
recovery, and might easily justify the inclusion of gays as well. As a progressive

210. US Const, Amend XIV, S 5.
211. It implies that cultural difference is ideally a basis for territorial self-government,
or since this is not possible, for the recognition that one cannot be judged by the standards of normality imposed by others. Although this anticolonial paradigm might seem on

its face to embrace the desirability of multiculturalism, it rests, as we have seen, on the
assumption that ultimately, all individual rights are based on the collective right to exclude
or dominate "other" cultures in the name of preserving one's own. Among many intellectuals today, imperial domination is taken as a paradigm of all injustice, and every

expression of cultural difference is asserted as a residue of a thwarted right to be ruled
by one's own people. See, for example, Andrew Parker, et al, eds, Nationalisms and

Sexualities (Routledge, 1992).
212. For further discussion see, Robert Meister, Review of The Partial Constitution, 23

Pol Theory 182 (1995).
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instrument of Reconstruction, the Fourteenth Amendment can thus be said to
extend the logic of survivorship from former slaves to other victimized groups
that become capable of telling parallel stories in which the nation as a whole can
potentially identify a common sense of victimhood and ultimate survival.213
Although there is now a clear Lincolnian strand of Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, it was not fully apparent for nearly a century. This absence is
partly attributable to the continuing influence of Dred Scott on the interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment described above, and partly to the fact that the
first successful survivor story was that of the defeated South that also fit the
Marshallian model of Reconstruction discussed in the preceding section." 4 For
seventy-five years, the combination of these two factors meant that the Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted on questions of race in a manner that was
largely consistent with the treatment of stateless minorities in a world in which
Woodrow Wilson's vision (what we might call "equal but separate") was
considered an ultimate, if unattainable, ideal. This changed only in 1954 when
the great case of Brown,"' outlawing segregation in the public schools, began
the Second Reconstruction.
One way to describe the significance of the paradigm shift engendered by
Brown would be to say that the Warren Court implicitly adopted a Lincolnian
view of Reconstruction and its implications for Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. We can appreciate the magnitude of this shift by remembering that
Herbert Wechsler, a civil rights liberal, was troubled by the apparent fact that
segregation laws216 were equally restrictive on blacks and whites, while the
Court's desegregation ruling seemed to burden whites for the benefit of blacks.
In criticizing the Warren Court's reasoning in Brown, Wechsler called for a
constitutional justification that was "neutral" between the desire of blacks to
associate with whites and the desire of whites not to associate with blacks. His
demand for "neutral principles" of constitutional adjudication217 was implicitly
based on the Marshallian model of constitutional rights as traces of sovereignty
that require judicial decisions analogous to choice of law questions in private international law. If, however, the equal protection clause is interpreted through a
model of Reconstruction as a survivor story commemorating the trauma of

213. For a suggestion that this may have been part of the original intent, see Note, Sex
Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost History, 97 Yale L J 1153, 1158-63

(1988).
214. The film, The Birth of a Nation (Epoch, 1915), tells the survivor story of the
South. The works of post-Civil War Southern historians, such as Ulrich B. Phillips,
contributed to the aura of the tragedy surrounding the "lost cause." See Kenneth M.
Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Antebellum South 3 (Knopf, 1956);
Genovese, The Political Economy of Slavery 70-84 (cited in note 124).
215. 347 US 483 (1954).
216. And also state antimiscegenation laws that were later struck down in Loving v
Virginia, 388 US 1 (1967).
217. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv
L Rev 1 (1959).
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slavery, then neutrality of the kind demanded by Wechsler is not a serious concern. This was the deep significance of the Warren Court's decision to overrule
Plessy v Ferguson218 on the grounds that, as a matter of law, racial segregation

is inherently stigmatizing to blacks.219 In effect, the historical meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment was once again tied to the Thirteenth Amendment's
abolition of slavery.
The great achievement of the Warren Court was thus to revive, if not wholly
to endorse, the plausibility of a Lincolnian interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and of Reconstruction generally.2 ' This interpretation is, in essence, that the United States survived its legacy of slavery by making a constitutional commitment not to repeat the patterns and practices deriving from it.
From this perspective the Equal Protection Clause forbids discrimination against
blacks even before it forbids discrimination on the basis of race. The Warren
Court's success can be measured by the extent to which Wechsler's call for
"neutrality" in equal protection jurisprudence was rejected by the courts, and
eventually by large segments of legal academia."'
There is still, however, no widespread agreement about whether the Fourteenth Amendment is essentially remedial in matters of race, or whether it merely
represents the nation as having "survived" racism. The view that the Fourteenth
Amendment is a remedy for a past violation of rights is strengthened if we read
the Thirteenth Amendment as memorializing that violation.m If, however, the
Fourteenth Amendment is read (via the Gettysburg Address) as part of a national
survival story, then each new repetition of a pattern or practice of racism is a
new violation of rights. When such a new violation can be shown, the presumption that it revives old traumas can justify the imposition of drastic remedies. But
when a new civil rights violation cannot be found, federal courts will often be
inclined to accept a more Marshallian model of nondiscrimination that makes
local whites the virtual representatives of the local black minority, but protects
those whites from being significantly disadvantaged for the benefit of blacks.
This is the dilemma of nonremedial affirmative action in a society in which

218. 163 US 537 (1896).
219. Brown, 347 US at 494-95.
220. Further research is needed to determine how far other constitutional departures of
the Warren era were based on similar rationales. To what extent, for example, was the
so-called "revolution" in criminal procedure based on an image of Americans, especially
blacks and Hispanics, as survivors of police states, and to what extent was it based on
neutral principles that would be extended to anyone living apart from his or her people?
221. See, for example, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 55 (Harvard, 1980). Ely,
a former Warren clerk, upholds neutrality as a stricture of judicial method, but not as a
matter of substantive content. In his view, the Equal Protection Clause has the neutralizing
role of "facilitating the representation of minorities." Id at 135-79. Writing at the apogee
of the post-Warren Court consensus, Laurence Tribe makes short shrift of Wechsler. See
Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law 1517 n 23 (Foundation, 2d ed 1988).
222. See, for example, Guyora Binder, Did the Slaves Author the Thirteenth Amendment? An Essay in Redemptive History, 5 Yale J L & Hum Rts 471 (1993).
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a numerical majority may someday consist of constitutionally protected minorities. We already face this dilemma insofar as women are entitled to protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 223 Can we say of the survivors of patriarchy
that the law forbids discrimination against women even before it forbids discrimination on the basis of gender? The courts are not yet clear about whether
discrimination on the basis of sexual difference is wrong, if and only if, it is discrimination against women. Are women entitled to whatever benefits men give
themselves in a male-dominated world? Are they entitled to whatever they could
reasonably expect in a female-dominated world? Or are they entitled to a
renewed social union based on a shared memory of their special history of
oppression and incestuous abuse?
Similar dilemmas are likely to appear as a growing number of immigrant
"sojourners" become eligible for the preferential treatment originally intended for
the domestic "survivors" of historical acts of persecution. Should one be able to
immigrate into a constitutionally protected group if the original grounds for the
protection was the creation of a new national identity for the victims and
perpetrators of a past atrocity? Why not, if the basis of the atrocity was itself
national origin or race?
A particularly disturbing implication of the Lincolnian version of Fourteenth
Amendment history is that constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment are generally extended to victimized groups only after they have already
survived well enough to tell their story. One thing that blacks, Asians, Hispanics,
and women have in common is that their civil rights received effective constitutional protection after their success at political mobilization, and not as an
immediate response to their earlier experiences of oppression under the color of
law.

224

Perhaps a more disturbing implication, however, is that this view of Reconstruction has made it difficult to claim constitutionally protected status for
victimized groups, such as indigenous tribes, that have not been able to survive.
There are, as we have already seen, troubling connections between Lincolnian
Reconstruction and the claims of the survivors in our national history to a

223. See Frontiero v Richardson 411 US 677, 682-84 (1973); Note, 97 Yale L J 1153
(cited in note 213).
224. In a provocative series of articles, Martin Shapiro has argued that, from 1937
through the Warren and Burger eras, the Supreme Court in effect gave constitutional

status to the various interest groups making up the New Deal coalition-first, by
upholding labor legislation, and then by protecting (and calling forth) other New Deal
constituencies, such as blacks and women, that legislatures had previously failed to protect.
See, for example, Martin Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in M. Judd
Harmon, ed, Essays on the Constitution of the United States ch S (Kennikat, 1978);
Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger, in Anthony King, ed, The
New American Political System ch 5 (American Enterprise Institute, 1978); and Martin
Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search for Values, in
Vincent Blasi, ed, The Burger Court: The Counter-Revolution that Wasn't ch 11 (Yale,
1983).
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manifest destiny that may not have appeared inevitable to their absent victims.
The difficulties described above reflect the fact that the survivor model never
fully eclipsed the sojourner model, even in the Warren Court's development of
Brown. With the benefit of hindsight we can now see that both models were
present in the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and that both
are present in Brown. Arguably, Brown would not have taken hold were it not
for the emergence of independent African states and the Cold War imperative to
repudiate racism.' This is a Wilsonian point, consistent with the sojourner
model. In embracing the Lincolnian model, however, the Warren Court made
unavoidable the problem confronting the interactions and conflicts between the
two models at the level of constitutional decision-making. The consequences of
these interactions and conflicts are clearly apparent when we consider the
problems that arise when the Court and its critics attempt to interpret the First
Amendment according to the models of Reconstruction embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. THE INCORPORATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH

Recent advocates of regulating hate speech have placed American discussions
of civil liberties within the broader gamut of constitutional responses to national
histories of human rights abuse.227 Our national commitment to overcome a
history of slavery, they argue, should give government an affirmative duty to
keep anti-black advocacy off the political agenda in much the way that a postNazi Germany is appropriately committed to suppressing anti-Semitic advocacy.2

8

This is not merely a prudential argument for suppressing free speech so that
history does not repeat itself. In its strongest form it is, rather, an argument that
groups whose history of oppression have constitutional weight may also have a
constitutional right to live in a nonhostile environment, and thus to be protected
from even symbolic repetitions of the forms of their oppression. The argument
225. Prewar abolitionist sojourners and postwar slave survivors had both been denied
rights in Southern states that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to protect. See
Binder, 5 Yale J L & Hum Rts at 480 (cited in note 222); Binder, Cardozo L Rev (cited
in note 98) (forthcoming); and Lash, 88 Nw U L Rev 1133-37 (cited in note 35).
226. See Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 Stan L Rev 61
(1988); Derrick Bell Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Harv L Rev 518, 524 (1980).
227. The work of Mari Matsuda is particularly notable in this regard. See, for example,
Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, 17 (cited in note 158). See generally,
Matsuda, et al, eds, Words That Wound (cited in note 158); Catharine A. MacKinnon,
Only Words (Harvard, 1993). Compare Henry Louis Gates Jr., Let Them Talk: Why Civil
Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil Rights, New Republic 37 (Sept 20 & 27, 1993).
228. See, for example, Marjorie Miller, German Ban on Holocaust Denial Upheld, LA
Times A7 (Apr 27, 1994); Rick Atkinson, Denial of Nazi Holocaust Brings 3-1/2-year
Sentence, Wash Post A18 (Aug 30, 1995).
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advocates a jurisprudence of free speech that returns to the principles of national
reconstruction generally, and of the unfinished business of our own Reconstruction in particular.
The foregoing discussion, however, allows us to see that appealing to a
Reconstruction-based interpretation of the First Amendment conceals an ambiguity between the two approaches to the Reconstruction-based interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment described above. Was the Fourteenth Amendment, and
Reconstruction itself, a way to end the Civil War by including previously
underrepresented groups, beginning with the defeated South, in the scope of
national constitutional protection? Or were they, rather, a way of continuing the
antislavery goals of the Civil War by other means? In what ways does the Fourteenth Amendment function as an amnesty for slavery and secession? In what
ways is it a commemoration of those historical occurrences?
The questions about the nature and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
become even more critical when we remember that the First Amendment became
enforceable against the States only through a process of selective incorporation
under the Fourteenth, and that the twentieth century debate over incorporation
has turned in part on how and why the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified.
Akhil Reed Amar has argued that correctly interpreting the present meaning of
the Bill of Rights is largely a matter of fitting the Madisonian "pegs" of our
antebellum constitution into the "holes" of Reconstruction.229 In a series of
other provocative articles, Amar argues that a full acknowledgment of the antislavery origins of the Fourteenth Amendment will require major changes in the
interpretation of the portions of the Bill of Rights incorporated under it.23
Interestingly, Amar's account of the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment sometimes focuses on the antebellum experience of abolitionists whose freedom of
speech and religion was denied when they were sojourners in slave states, and
sometimes focuses on the experiences of freed slaves before and after the Civil
2 31

War.

Using the framework developed in this Article, we can see that Amar's view
of the antislavery origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, for all its subtlety,
obscures the fact that some moments of incorporation recast the original Bill of
Rights to fit the model of Reconstruction as a survivor story, and that others
recast the logic of the Bill of Rights within the sojourner model. There is thus, in

229. See Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1260-62 (cited in note 70).
230. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131,
1201-02 (1991); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Comments on The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 15 Harv J L & Pub Pol 99, 102-08 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, Anti-Federalists, The
Federalist Papers, and the Big Argument for Union, 16 Harv J L & Pub Pol 16 111
(1993); and Amar, 106 Harv L Rev 151-60 (cited in note 70).
231. Compare Amar's scholarship with Jacobus Ten Broek, Equal Under Law (Collier,
1965). For an important earlier discussion of the role of the civil rights struggle in First
Amendment jurisprudence, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment
(Ohio State, 1965).
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what we call our First Amendment jurisprudence, evidence of the two versions
of nondiscrimination described in this Article, and of the continuing tension
between them. In the pages that follow I shall show how this redescription of
First Amendment jurisprudence sheds new light on certain issues involving
religion, speech, and pornography.
1. Religion.
Oddly, the only clause of the First Amendment that Amar thinks should not
have been incorporated under the Fourteenth is the Establishment Clause.2 2 He
plausibly reads the original language forbidding Congress to legislate "respecting
the establishment of religion" as a simultaneous bar to federal establishment of
religion and to federal interference with religious establishments in the states
(especially including state-sponsored religious schools). 233 From this he concludes that the enforceability of the Establishment Clause against the states does
not fit the "Reconstruction-based" logic of incorporation under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
In fact, however the Fourteenth Amendment rationale for incorporating the
Establishment Clause was an instance in which the Court explicitly extended the
Lincolnian logic of survivor stories to a new area of law where it would eventually clash with the competing Fourteenth Amendment logic based on the rights
of sojourners. Writing in the aftermath of World War II in 1947, Justice Black
describes Americans as a nation of refugees from religious persecution:
[T]he early settlers of this country came here from Europe to escape the
bondage of laws which compelled them to support and attend governmentfavored churches. The centuries immediately before and contemporaneous
with the colonization of America had been filled with turmoil, civil strife,
and persecutions... With the power of government supporting them, at
various times and places, Catholics had persecuted Protestants, Protestants
had persecuted Catholics, Protestant sects had persecuted other Protestant
sects ... and all of these had from time to time persecuted Jews. In efforts
to force loyalty to whatever religious group happened to be... in league
with the government... men and women had been fined, cast in jail,
cruelly tortured, and killed? 5
We survivors of this history, Black suggests, adopted the Establishment
Clause to commemorate, rather than to repeat it. In essence, Black is arguing

232. See Amar, 100 Yale L J 1131 (cited in note 230).
233. Id at 1157.
234. See id at 1158-60. Amar is not opposed to the conception of public secularism
that Warren Court liberalism drew from the Establishment Clause. Rather, he argues that
most of the current applications of the Establishment Clause against the states could have
been better justified under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Lash, 88 Nw U L Rev 1145-56 (cited in note 35), for a view of Reconstruction that
supports the incorporation of the Free Exercise Clause under the Fourteenth Amendment.
235. Everson v Bd of Educ, 330 US 1, 8-9 (1947).
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that liberal constitutionalism is a rationale for excluding the promotion of certain
historically troubling goals from the public agenda on straightforward Lincolnian
grounds-national unity and a commitment not to repeat the past.
After it became enforceable against the states, the Establishment Clause was
interpreted to require the asymmetrical treatment of religious and nonreligious
speech in official contexts. The most notable example was the Court's decision
to exclude certain types of devotional religious expression (such as prayer) from
operating public institutions (such as public schools).236 Recently, some courts
have viewed this exclusion as a silencing of religious values on the basis of
content alone-a violation of the Speech Clause of the First Amendment as well
as the Free Exercise Clause. 37 This straightforward claim of persecution implicitly portrays religious speakers as members of an alternative political majority
marooned in a secular humanist state that has no neutral basis for discriminating
against religious speech.
Most constitutional liberals, however, are not embarrassed by this attack on
the discriminatory implications of the Establishment Clause for free speech. They
continue to insist, as Black did in 1947, that the United States was founded by
survivors of religious persecution, and that our democratic tradition of free
speech has flourished by excluding overtly religious projects from the public
realm. Establishment Clause liberals argue that we have an historical commitment to show special solicitude for the historical victims of religious persecution
elsewhere and for potential victims of religious persecution here. Under the
historical circumstances of 1947, this commitment required a departure from the
view that the United States has always been a Christian nation in order to accommodate and welcome Jews, and by implication, practitioners of other nonChristian faiths who might otherwise feel excluded from the national community.
The Establishment Clause, for most liberals, is an affirmative constitutional commitment to treat religious and nonreligious speech asymmetrically.23
This rationale for incorporation of the Establishment Clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment does not always govern its interpretation. Sometimes the
argument for not discriminating against Christianity prevails over Hugo Black's
survivor story. In several recent public forum cases, which tend to involve school
buildings when school is not in session, the Court has used the sojourner logic
of nondiscrimination to uphold the use of public facilities by religious

236. Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962); Abington Sch Dist v Schempp, 374 US 203
(1963); Lee v Weisman, 505 US 577 (1992).
237. See, for example, Grossbaum v Indianapolis-Marion County Building Authority, 63
F3d 581 (7th Cir 1995) (city's prohibition of the display of a menorah in a public
building, which was predicated by concern over its religious significance, held to violate
the First Amendment); Doe v Small, 964 F2d 611 (7th Cir 1992) (terms of an injunction
against displaying religious paintings on public grounds held to be overbroad and case

remanded to the District Court for a more "tailored" and "content-neutral" injunction).
238. For a version of Establishment Clause liberalism that responds to recent First
Amendment counterarguments see Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, in
Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, The Bill of Rights in the Modern State 195-223 (Chicago, 1992).
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groups.239 In these cases, the religious groups are viewed as strangers in a

secular state who must be accorded the same right of access to public facilities
that the secular majority gives itself-they cannot be denied the right to speak
and associate merely because their speech and association is religious. This is a
reflection of the first version of Reconstruction in which claims to constitutional
equality are traces of the competing claims to sovereignty of locals and sojourners. In interpreting these cases, however, the federal courts have made it reasonably clear that the survivor story model of the Establishment Clause should still
be dominant where it clearly applies, as it does in public elementary schools
during the school day.
2. Speech.
The two logics of constitutional protection have a different relation in the
judicial interpretation of the Speech Clause. Here the survivor story model has
been generally subordinate to the sojourner model. This occurred, in part,
because the Speech Clause was incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment
as a result of cases arising out of American involvement in World War I,24 a
war in which the United States had chosen sides, first among the nations of the
Old World and then against the revolutionaries in Russia.24 Many of the cases
leading to the incorporation of the Speech Clause arose because the government
used the pretext of a foreign war and the possibility of a domestic revolution to
persecute aliens and dissidents through state and federal laws forbidding the
advocacy of certain beliefs that the government considered dangerous to political
stability.242
In this context, it is admittedly odd to label the position of Holmes and

239. See, for example, Lamb's Chapel v Center Moricbes Union Scb Dist, 113 S Ct
2141 (1993); Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263 (1981); Westside Bd of Educ v Mergens,
496 US 226 (1990). These cases hold that governments may deny religious groups access
to a public forum only if all other private groups are likewise denied access.
240. Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925) states in dictum that First Amendment "freedom of speech and of the press" are enforceable against the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment. This is a "Red Scare" case arising in 1919, and strongly
influenced by the immediate aftermath of World War I and the Russian Revolution. The
Speech Clause is finally incorporated in Fiske v Kansas, 274 US 380 (1927), and the Press
Clause is incorporated in Near v Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931).
241. World War I was a controversial war that followed a period in which the United
States had experienced unprecedented levels of immigration from countries on both sides.
Some of these immigrants were dissidents, even revolutionaries, against their former governments, while some were reluctant to take up arms against a former homeland, believing
that the United States had entered the war on the wrong side. See, for example, Richard
Polenberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, The Supreme Court, and Free Speech ch 1

(Penguin, 1987).
242. See Gitlow, 268 US at 667-68. See also Fiske, 274 US at 386-87; Scbenck v
United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919); Polenberg, Fighting Faiths ch 1 (cited in note 241);
and Harry J. Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America chs 10-11

(Harper and Row, 1988).
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Brandeis that speech should not be regulated on the basis of content as
Wilsonian because it was Wilson's own repressive policies that they opposed.
Nevertheless, we can plausibly say that the Holmes-Brandeis approach to the
protection of speech was parallel in its logic to the protection of the rights of
alien minorities in the Wilsonian international system and to the protection of
out-of-state sojourners in Marshallian federalism. The familiar core of Holmes's
approach was to forbid state and federal regulation of speech on the basis of
content alone, and to require that government prove a "clear and present danger" on a case-by-case basis.243 Such an approach would allow suppression of
any would-be subversive who was likely to succeed in imposing his or her
will,244 while preventing official discrimination against the mere utterance of
foreign beliefs-the speech (of those) we hate. Although Amar has argued that
the Reconstruction-based rationale for incorporating the Speech Clause under the
Fourteenth Amendment would have been to reverse the antebellum ban on
abolitionist speech in the slave states,24 this view conflates the survivor story
model of constitutional protection with the sojourner model in which the typical
Northern abolitionist was an out-of-state citizen who had been denied federal
protection in the South because the content of his speech had been banned by
state law.2" Holmes's "clear and present danger test"-the version of speechprotection that was first incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment-protects peripheral minorities whose views are merely foreign or unpopular, but would probably not have protected an abolitionist in the slaveholding
South whose incitement of local slaves was both unpopular and dangerous to the
established order.
A Holmesian ban on content-based discrimination requires, as I have written
elsewhere, that a demonstration by the Ku Klux Klan in Harlem must be treated
in the same way as a demonstration by Martin Luther King in Cicero.247 From
this perspective it would not matter that the state action necessary to protect the
rights of demonstrators in the first case could involve the use of police violence
against blacks at the initiative of white racists, a repetition of the pattern of

243. Holmes first articulated the "clear and present danger" standard in Schenck, where

the Court considered whether a conspiracy to obstruct the draft was punishable under the
Espionage Act. As Holmes noted:

The question . . . is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of
proximity and degree.

249 US at 52.
244. Judge Learned Hand would have required proof that there was also intent to subvert. See Masses Pub Co v Patten, 244 F 535, 539 (1917).
245. See Amar, 101 Yale L J at 1215-16 (cited in note 70).
246. The 1844 experience of the Northern abolitionist, Samuel Hoar, in South Carolina
is sometimes cited to make this point. See Harrison, 101 Yale L J at 1465 n 305 (cited

in note 18).
247. See Robert Meister, Journalistic Silence and Governmental Speech: Can Institutions
Have Rights?, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev 319, 373 (1981).
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historical abuse that the Reconstruction Amendments arguably aim to prevent.248 More broadly, it would not matter whether historically dominant
patterns of oppression are reinforced or offset by the state action necessary to
promote free speech. 49
If, however, we abandon the Holmesian model in favor of the survivor story
model, these considerations would matter whenever the state has an affirmative
duty to offset the continuing effect of past oppression. This suggests that the key
to incorporating the logic of survivorship into the interpretation of the Speech
Clause is the degree to which state action is involved in the imposition of the
speech of one private actor on another.-"
Recent scholarship suggests this issue is unavoidable. Contrary to prevailing
First Amendment orthodoxy, the state is never neutral with respect to the private
speech that it protects. Its actions and omissions always subsidize one side rather
than another." A "survivor story"-based approach would consider whether
the nature and extent of that subsidy constitutes a repetition of an invidious
historical pattern.
Our previous discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation of the
Establishment Clause can help to illuminate this point. Establishment clauses are
not generally a way of asserting government neutrality-they are rather a way to
disestablish an institution about which government can never be truly neutral.
The disestablishment of slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment is certainly
an example of a subject on which the U.S. government may not be neutral (no
more than the present German government can properly be neutral on Nazism
or the occurrence of the Holocaust). Once the survivor story model of constitutional interpretation is taken seriously, we can see that the Thirteenth Amendment might require that the Speech Clause be interpreted asymmetrically for
state-endorsed racist and non-racist speech, in much the way that the Establishment Clause now requires the Speech Clause to be interpreted asymmetrically for
state endorsed religious and nonreligious speech.z By parallel reasoning one
248. Nor would it not matter in the case of Nazis marching through Skokie, a well-off
Chicago suburb inhabited by a large concentration of Holocaust survivors, whether the
demonstration was a protest by an unpopular minority in Chicago politics (the Nazis) or
a further act of persecution of an oppressed minority in world history (the Jews). See
generally, Meister, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 374-75 (cited in note 247). But see Meister,
Political Identity 168-75 (cited in note 198).
249. Meister, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 373-76 (cited in note 247). Compare this view
with Amar, 106 Harv L Rev 124 (cited in note 70).
250. In a recent article, Akhil Reed Amar has taken a similar view. Treading carefully
through the bate speech debate, he argues that government protection of private hate
speech involuntarily imposed upon blacks could be banned under both the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments, which authorize courts to consider the broader effects of the
private enslavement of one person by another. See Amar, 106 Harv L Rev at 156-61
(cited in note 70).
251. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (Harvard, 1994); Cass R. Sunstein,
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (Free Press, 1993); and Meister, 23 Pol
Theory 182 (cited in note 212).
252. This is different from suggesting, as James Forman, Jr., does, that the racial
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might argue that a post-Zionist Israel (or a post-Serbian Bosnia) could, for
2 s3
reasons of disestablishment, legitimately ban Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses
even though such an action would be illegitimate for most other countries,
including Iran.
Allowing for this type of constitutional reasoning, however, does not mean
that we must practice a First Amendment jurisprudence in which any analogy
between a speech act and a previous act of identity-based oppression will
"trump" the right to free speech as we now know it.2" 4 The survivor story
model, as explained above, should not rely on mere analogies between collective
and individual recovery-the causal links between collective and individual
2
traumas need to be carefully examined for every individual and group. 1s
Such causal claims may be, and often are, pretextual, but they are intelligible
and cannot be dismissed without addressing in a lawyerly fashion the normal
evidentiary questions about presumptions and burdens of proof. Such questions
would structure our inquiry into the social psychology of trauma and transference: Does generational change erase trauma and cancel guilt? Or are there
generation-skipping effects in the transmission of traumatic memories that can be
subsequently recovered as a basis for new historical claims? On the basis of such
a causal inquiry, we might plausibly conclude that a nation with a history of
racial persecution, such as ours, has an affirmative duty to commemorate that
history and to prevent past patterns from repeating themselves, much as the
German state (as a successor to Nazism) has an affirmative duty not to be
neutral in its treatment of antisemitic advocacy-a duty, for example, to de-

equivalent of the Establishment Clause would require government to be somehow nonpartisan in its official speech. See James Forman, Jr., Driving Dixie Down: Removing the
Confederate Flag from Southern State Capitols, 101 Yale L J 505 (1991). For the origin
of Forman's conception of a political version of the Establishment Clause, see Mark G.
Yudoff, When Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the
First Amendment, 57 Tex L Rev 863 (1979); Robert D. Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 Cal L Rev 1104 (1979). For a critique
of Kamenshine and Yudoff, see Meister, 16 Harv CR-CL L Rev at 322-28 (cited in note

247).
253. Salman Rushdie, The Satanic Verses (Viking, 1988).
254. Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 Harv L Rev 1639
(1993). It is interesting that Kozinski and Volokh implicitly take a post-modern view of
the plasticity of metaphorical thinking, and hence regard it as unsuitably arbitrary as a
basis for legal argument. See id at 1647, 1650, 1653-54, 1657.
255. The general nature of the causal claim to be examined is, however, relatively clear:
in threatening the collective myth of survival, a new stressor has caused the former victim
to unconsciously reenact the original traumatic experience and to regress to the unsuccessful mechanisms of defense against it. These defenses might include repetition-compulsion,
anxiety, intrusive imagery, and exaggerated startle-responses. Note that the causal claim is
not, for example, that a racial epithet repeats the harm of slavery-as stressors there is a
world of difference between the two. The claim is rather that the racial epithet causes a
harmful regression to the defenses against the unresolved trauma of slavery-harmful
directly to the mental health of the former victim, and also because of its indirect effect
on the behavior of the victim and others.
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nounce such advocacy and not to honor the symbols of Nazi rule."5 Quite
possibly, however, one's acceptance of any such conclusion would depend upon
one's view of where the presumptions and burdens in the causal argument ought
to lie.
3. Pornography.
We must, however, distinguish the foregoing discussion of hate speech from
Catharine MacKinnon's well-known view that any pornographic representation
of a woman as demeaned or oppressed is in itself an act that demeans or oppresses women .2 7 Her claim is that pornography is experienced as an act of
sexual abuse by its female viewers, and that it discriminates against all women
by marking them as persons to be raped and otherwise abused."
MacKinnon's position has not always been so strongly grounded in the
survivor story model. In her first book, dealing with sexual harassment in the
workplace, she persuasively analyzed the impossibility of addressing gender-based
oppression within a logic in which women are virtually represented by men. 25 9
As an alternative, she advocated a version of Marshall's sojourner model in
which male desires and attitudes would no longer be accepted as the standard of
what is reasonable and normal for women. It would be equally valid, she
suggested, to regard men as strangers in a world in which laws were made by
world as
and for women, and to view the difference between that world and this
20
now.
and
here
women
against
discrimination
of
measure
precise
the
The device of seeing the world from a woman's point of view is not, however, a strong enough basis for regulating the pornography that some men see,
unless it proves to be true that the female performers in pornography are not
merely pretending to be demeaned by their performance. 26 ' This would justify
the conclusion that the pornography industry really demeans those women, and
that the public participation in such acts of humiliation via the market is no less
obscene than paying to watch someone be tortured.26 2

256. Similar duties have already been recognized, in limited contexts in regard to
"hostile-environment discrimination" in the workplace. To implement this duty there must
be some regulation of overtly abusive speech directed against individuals, although, as
Volokh notes, such regulation may have already gone beyond what the First Amendment
should permit. See Comment, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA
L Rev 1791, 1819-43 (1992).
257. See Catherine A. MacKinnon, Pornography As Defamation and Discrimination, 71
BU L Rev 793, 803-04 (1991).
258. Id at 798-802.
259. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of
Sex Discrimination 144-46 (Yale, 1979).
260. Id at 144.
261. Compare MacKinnon, 71 BU L Rev at 810-13, 815 (cited in note 257).
262. MacKinnon here conflates merely pretending to be engaged in what is, arguably,
the sexual oppression of women with pretending to pretend. For an elaboration of this
argument, see Robert Meister, Vigilante Action Against Pornography: The Symbolic
Destruction of Symbols, Social Text 3 (Fall 1985). Compare this with Catharine A.
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For a time, MacKinnon relied heavily on such an argument, thereby postponing First Amendment concerns.263 To address those concerns, she has now
developed a claim that justifies the content-based censorship of devotional
religious speech in public schools, and that might arguably ban derogatory racial
epithets directed by a white against an unwilling "captive" audience of one or
more blacks. 264 To make such a claim, MacKinnon must tell a survivor story.
Her most recent book begins by asking us all-victims and perpetrators alike-to
identify ourselves with the collective survivors of sexual abuse:
Imagine that for hundreds of years your most formative traumas, your
daily suffering and pain, the abuse you live through, the terror you live
with, are unspeakable ... . You grow up with your father holding you
down...
so another man can make a horrible searing pain between your
265
legs.

It would take a Lincolnian rebirth memorializing such a collective history of
sexual oppression to make the restrictions on speech that MacKinnon advocates
seem a natural way to protect women from the trauma of repetition within our
present constitutional framework. If she is indeed propounding such a view,
however, MacKinnon would have to argue that the trauma of rape-and the
defenses against it-are actually relived in the course of every pornographic
experience inflicted upon women. This is a burden of proof she has yet to meet.
IV. Conclusion
This Article has been a first effort to explore the tensions between two logics
of constitutional development, to show that they are linked, and to suggest that
they are deeply embedded in the ways we have come to think about politics.
I have suggested throughout this Article that the articulation of each model
represents a distinctive American political contribution to world political
thought. Our mode of constitutional discourse is partly responsible for this
contribution, as is the fact that our war of national liberation and our civil war
were historically discrete events that made quite different demands on constitutional thought.
I hope, however, that this Article serves to undermine the all-too-frequent
assumption that American constitutional development took place in (blessed)
isolation from the problems of international order that affected other parts of the
world. Contrary to this prevailing view, I have argued that the American vision
of an interstate system was a creative, but not wholly successful, solution to

MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 125-213 (Harvard, 1987).
263. See, for example, MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 127-33 (cited in note 262).
264. For a suggestion of this kind, see Amar, 106 Harv L Rev at 157-58 (cited in note
70).
265. MacKinnon, Only Words at 3 (cited in note 227).
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problems of jurisdiction and choice of law in a transnational civil society. In
turning to Lincoln, however, I have also argued that American national identity
has been based on a troubled marriage of the transnational logic of survivorship
on which he drew, and the logic of protecting sojourners that links Marshallian
federalism to Wilsonian internationalism.
Throughout this Article, I have used constitutional metaphors--originally
American-to identify the inherent connections between domestic and international politics, and between past trauma and present identity. My concluding
suggestion, however, is that in their fundamental logic the sojourner and survivor
models are not uniquely American, and that their interaction lies at the root of
political consciousness in countries where the moment of national liberation is
much more difficult to distinguish from the moment of civil war. Even the most
cursory survey would suggest that both models are frequently in play throughout
the world, and that the combination of the two is often volatile.
Nowhere is the pervasive interaction and conflict between our two models
better illustrated than in the case of Israel, which has attempted to weave a
Lincolnian story of survival and redemption into the Wilsonian shell of Zionism
and the Balfour declaration. The Second World War would probably not have
been fought by Wilsonian national leaders to save the Jews and other Nazi
victims, but the fact that it arguably accomplished this (if only barely) made it
possible for postwar politicians to construct a story of survival and redemption
from their "discovery" of the German record of genocide. 2" Since 1947, it has
been a covenantal element in the survivor story on which postwar Western unity
was based that Israel-a place of refuge for the survivors and potential victims
of the Holocaust-should not have to internalize the costs of its own defense.
This principle, however, has always been difficult to reconcile with the logic
of the Wilsonian system of minorities that provided an independent, and earlier,
rationale for the restoration of a Jewish national homeland in a partitioned

266. The memory of the German atrocities is a major factor that distinguishes the
Lincolnian outcome of World War II from the Wilsonian outcome of World War I-the
second time around Europe survived and recovered by shouldering and sharing a burden
of German guilt that was potentially unbearable.
There is no single thinker who has articulated the pervasive role of the survivor
story in the logic of European Recovery. Certainly, George C. Marshall took a Lincolnian
stance after World War 1I, but his Harvard Speech is not the Gettysburg Address-it
contains too much realpolitik and anticommunism, and too little sense of sin and
redemption. The principal architects of post-war European recovery-figures such as Jean
Monnet and Robert Schuman-were also Lincolnian in spirit, if not always in words
(although the same can be said of Lincoln himself). In their Harvard addresses commemorating the Marshall Plan, both Willy Brandt and Richard von Weizsgcker came closer to
articulating its meaning for European union and recovery than Marshall himself. But to
my knowledge there is no public figure who has articulated a full alternative to Wilsonian
internationalism by connecting what I have called the Lincolnian paradigm to global
politics. See Stanley Hoffmann and Charles Maier, eds, The Marshall Plan: A Retrospective
(Westview, 1984); Richard von Weizscker, Speeches for Our Time 31 (Johns Hopkins,
1992) ("The Marshall Plan").
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Palestine. Tragically, Israel became an example of that theory's most troubling
implications as Zionism created, in its turn, a pan-Arabism around the issue of
Palestinian statelessness. 267 Yet, until recently, every effort to address this issue
raised the specter for Jews, and for the Western democracies, of the Holocaust
repeating itself. There is no nation in which the principle of "Never Again" is
more deeply honored than it is in Israel.
In the contemporary world the most militant opponents of the self-determination of indigenous peoples-Serbians today, and only yesterday Afrikaners and
Israelis-tend to see themselves as survivors and their politics as a covenantal
commitment that history not be repeated. "Never again," they say, even if this
means saying "never" to internal demands that may seem from an external
perspective no less legitimate than their own claims.
As the example of Serbia illustrates, this phenomenon is not limited to new
nations-former settler colonies in which sojourners with the consciousness of
survivors forge national unity while opposing the autonomy of indigenous
groups. The new nations, moreover, were themselves a product of global migrations that have by now largely erased the distinction between wars of national
liberation and civil wars, except at the level of national myth. By now it is hard
to deny that modern nationalism is itself a product of the interaction of sojourners and survivors, and that the pure moment of liberation from purely foreign
power was largely an illusion of the imperialist age that came to a decisive end
after World War 1I.268
It is, however, equally true that World War II resulted in an extension of the
process begun at Versailles to most of the so-called "Third World." In almost
every case the result has been to create problematic linkages between the territorial power that a people exercises somewhere and their rights (or lack of
rights) somewhere else. The linkages have sometimes created external support for
the self-determination of peoples in the homeland while contributing to the
assimilation of representatives of those peoples in diaspora (Jews in Israel with

267. The works of Baruch Kimmerling and Meron Benvenisti are particularly instructive
here. See especially, Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of
a People (Free Press, 1993); Meron Benvenisti, Conflicts and Contradictions (New York,
1986). For further background see Baruch Kimmerling, A Conceptual Framework for the
Analysis of Behavior in a Territorial Conflict: The Generalization of the Israeli Case
(Jerusalem, 1979); Baruch Kimmerling, Zionism and Territory: The Socio-Territorial
Dimensions of Zionist Politics (California, 1983); Baruch Kimmerling, The Economic InterrelationshipsBetween the Arab and Jewish Communities in Mandatory Palestine (MIT,

1979); Meron Benvenisti, Israeli Censorship of Arab Publications: A Survey (Fund for Free
Expression, 1983); Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's
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Jews in America; Africans in Africa with African-Americans). In other cases,
there have been more problematic links between sojourning peoples and their
surviving co-nationals in the homeland (Tutsis in Uganda and in Rwanda;
Eritreans in Eritrea and in Ethiopia; Muslims in Pakistan and in India; Tamils in
India and in Sri Lanka). Throughout postindependence Africa, and in parts of
South Asia, a continuing process of civil war has been deeply interwoven with
2 69
unsatisfiable demands for national self-determination.
In the aftermath of the Pax Atomica, the thirty or forty civil wars that seem
to be active at any given moment7 0 are uneasy combinations of the Wilsonian
demand for cultural self-determination and the struggle to create a new national
unity based on the premise of shared guilt between the victims and perpetrators
of historical abuse. Following the path of many recovery movements, the
combatants in these wars also cultivate transnational linkages to other saving
remnants around the world.
This is not, however; the place for yet another prediction of the obsolescence
of nationalism, or the end of the territorial nation state as we know it.27 ' My
conclusion is, rather, that we do not know the nation state as well as we might
think, and that the foregoing analysis of sojourners and survivors (and of the
transnational and transtemporal dimensions of American democratic thought)
may cast a somewhat different light on what the system of nation states has
meant all along.2' Instead of regarding international politics as a construct

269. See generally, Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (California, 1985).
270. As Hans Magnus Enzensberger points out, the Pax Atomica suspended these logics
in some places for a time, partly by turning many local conflicts into truce lines in a
global Cold War and partly, perhaps, by raising different questions of survival. See
Enzensberger, Civil Wars at 14 (cited in note 65).
271. For arguments urging caution in reaching such conclusions see, John Gerard
Ruggie, Territorialityand Beyond: ProblematizingModernity in InternationalRelations, 47
Intl Organization 139 (1993); Michael Mann, Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, Not Dying, 122 Daedalus 115 (1993).
272. The current international system originated in a Thirty Years' War (really a series
of civil wars) between Catholic and Protestant "Internationals" that emerged in the
aftermath of the Reformation. The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 based local religion on
territorial sovereignty, and marked an end to the period of European military and political
alliances based on religion. The early modem system of states-combining sovereignty,
territorial exclusivity, and confessional uniformity-was to a significant extent a response
to the collapsing internationalism of the medieval Catholic world. The aftermath of that
collapse produced its waves of sojourners and survivors--often victims of religious persecution-until religion partially gave way to nationalism as the basis of allegiance to the
territorial ruler, and also as a new basis for territorial "cleansing". See Leo Gross, The
Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in Richard A. Falk and Wolfram Hanrieder, eds, International Law and Organization: An Introductory Reader 45 (Lippincott, 1968); F.H.
Hinsley, The Concept of Sovereignty and the Relations between States, 21 J Intl Aff 242
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in note 8). For a brief description of the transformation brought about by the Thirty
Years' War, see, Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe
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built on the foundation of pre-existing nations, we should regard the problems
of jurisdiction, participation, and equality as originally, and still essentially,
transnational in scope.
The abstractions of democratic theory that America proudly exports to the
world tend to obscure this dimension in a way that American legal history does
not. That history suggests that the central problems of democratic legitimacy will
be frequently misunderstood if questions of exclusion and inclusion in a political
order are taken to be already resolved before state action is legitimated. At any
given moment the existing system of states represents only a partial, temporary,
and essentially jurisdictional answer to questions that it cannot easily contain.
This is, perhaps, the most enduring lesson for the world of the American
experiment in democracy.

74-82 (Oxford, 1975).

